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THE GEOGRAPHY OF JUSTICE
Kal Raustiala*
INTRODUCTION
The Guantanamo Bay Naval Base ("Guantanamo") has been under
the control of the United States since 1903. Despite its century-long
presence, the official position of the U.S. government is that
Guantanamo is not American territory. An unusual agreement
declares that Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty" over Guantanamo.
The United States, however, exercises "complete jurisdiction and
control."'1 The precise legal "status of Guantanamo is no mere
historical curiosity. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the
United States has detained hundreds of foreign nationals at the base.
Over the last year, several attempted to challenge their detention via
habeas petitions.2 These petitions, brought by citizens of friendly
states, drew support from many quarters. Former U.S. ambassadors
argued that the detentions harm U.S. interests abroad;3 former
prisoners of war ("POWs") stressed the implications for Americans
captured abroad;4 allied governments brought heavy diplomatic
pressure to bear;5 and several senators demanded that the President
try or release the detainees.6
* Professor of Law, UCLA Law School. I thank Michael Doyle, Jack Goldsmith,
Andrew Guzman, Ira Katznelson, Larry Kramer, Gerry Neuman, Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Bill Stuntz, and Jeff Toobin for helpful discussions on this project. Aspects
of this Article were presented at workshops at Harvard, Columbia, Chicago, Hofstra,
Temple, Berkeley, and UCLA law schools, and at the Department of Politics at
Princeton. Financial support from UCLA Law School and from the Princeton
Program on Law and Public Affairs, where I was a Fellow in 2002-2003, is gratefully
acknowledged, as is the research assistance of Tom Hale, Betsy Bennion, Sapana
Shah, Venktatesh Vijayaraghavan, Fadi Amer, and Thomas Tso.
1. Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba,
art. III, 6 Bevans 1113, 1114, available at
http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/gazette/History 98-64/hisapxd.htm.
2. See, e.g., Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003); Al Odah v. United
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
3. See Brief of Diego C. Asencio et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343) (filed by
former U.S. diplomats).
4. See Brief of Former American Prisoners of War as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Rasul (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
5. The attention to the issue in Britain has been relentless. See, e.g., James Meek,
The People the Law Forgot, Guardian (London), Dec. 3, 2003, Features Pages, at 1,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/guantanamo/story/0,13743,1098604,00.html;
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Nonetheless, initially, these habeas petitions all failed. And they
failed for a deceptively simple reason. The reason was not that the
petitioners are enemy aliens or unlawful combatants.7 Rather, the
reason was their geographic location. Enemy combatants detained on
American soil are not per se barred from contesting their detention in
American courts.8  But federal courts have generally held that
foreigners -enemy or otherwise -detained outside the geographic
boundaries of the United States lack legal protections.' The U.S.
Supreme Court's decision last June in Rasul v. Bush1° surprised many
observers by holding that the federal habeas statute encompassed the
Guantanamo petitions. But the majority opinion rested on a narrow
issue of statutory interpretation: Did the federal habeas statute apply
to aliens as well as citizens abroad? The Court held that the statute
did so apply. Yet the decision said almost nothing about the
constitutional rights of aliens outside U.S. territory.11 And of course,
Congress can (and may) amend the habeas statute to deny access to
the writ to aliens held abroad. The decision in Rasul, while highly
Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, F.A. Mann Lecture at
Lincoln's Inn Old Hall, London (Nov. 25, 2003) (on file with author) (a surprisingly
harsh speech by one of the United Kingdom's top Law Lords).
6. See Neil A. Lewis, Try Detainees or Free Them, 3 Senators Urge, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 13, 2003, at A14 (quoting Senator John McCain, a former POW during the
Vietnam War, as stating that "[t]hey may not have any rights under the Geneva
Conventions as far as I'm concerned.., but they have rights under various human
rights declarations. And one of them is the right not to be detained indefinitely").
Several American officials reportedly doubt the utility of the detention strategy in
Guantanamo, in particular in light of the adverse public response around the globe.
See David Rose, Operation Take Away My Freedom: Inside Guantanamo Bay on
Trial, Vanity Fair, Jan. 2004, at 88, 136 (discussing the debate).
7. Indeed, they are not enemy aliens as that phrase is usually understood-they
include Australians, Kuwaitis, and British citizens. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1140. The
degree to which the status of enemy alien turns on nationality, and the impact of this
status on prior Supreme Court precedent, is contested in the Al Odah case. The
designation as an enemy alien is distinct from that of lawful or unlawful combatant.
See Louis Fisher, CRS Report for Congress, Military Tribunals: The Quirin
Precedent 33-34 (Mar. 26, 2002) (discussing the latter designation), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31340.pdf.
8. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
9. See, e.g., Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1140-41; Khalid v. Bush, Nos. 1:04-1142, 1:04-
1166, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749. at *21-*30 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2005); see also Coalition
of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Sean D. Murphy ed.,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Ability of
Detainees in Cuba to Obtain Habeas Corpus Review, 96 Am J. Int'l L. 481 (2002). As
I discuss below, there are several instances in which, as a doctrinal matter, aliens
abroad enjoy constitutional rights. See infra notes 114-15, 125 and accompanying text.
Moreover, I argue they ought to enjoy more and more complete constitutional and
statutory rights in many instances.
10. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
11. Footnote fifteen of Rasul, while dicta, implicitly claims that the Constitution
applies to aspects of the detention of aliens in Guantanamo (and, again implicitly,
other analogous U.S.-controlled territory). See id. at 2698 n.15; see also infra Part III
(discussing this issue extensively).
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significant for the petitioners, did not in any meaningful sense alter
the question of the constitutional rights of aliens abroad.
Why is geographic location thought to be determinative of the
rights of aliens abroad? The supposition that law and legal remedies
are connected to, or limited by, territorial location-a concept I term
"legal spatiality"-is commonplace and intuitive. Many Americans
have watched footage of Cuban refugees swimming ashore in Florida,
desperately trying to reach land before U.S. officials can grasp them.
Touching the territory of the United States -the physical soil itself-is
critical to the legal determination of their status: the difference
between a life of freedom in the United States and forced return to an
autocratic Cuba.12 This is a dramatic example of the power of legal
spatiality, but not an unusual one. The concept is suffused throughout
the law. Yet, perhaps precisely because it so commonplace, the
assumptions embedded in legal spatiality are rarely examined and
surprisingly ill-defended. 3
12. Cubans receive special treatment under U.S. law. Pursuant to the Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966, Cuban asylum seekers who reach U.S. soil are given
"preferential treatment by enabling them to enter the United States and achieve
permanent-resident status through a special process not offered to other refugees."
Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: iMirando por los Ojos de Don Quijote o
Sancho Panza?, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 902, 902 (2001); see also Thomas David Jones, A
Human Rights Tragedy: The Cuban and Haitian Refugee Crises Revisited, 9 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 479 (1995).
13. The primary exceptions to the dearth of research on these topics in the field of
extraterritoriality as a constitutional issue are the pathbreaking works of Gerald
Neuman, Louis Henkin, and Alex Aleinikoff. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Semblances of Sovereignty (2002); Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution
(1996) [hereinafter Strangers to the Constitution]; Louis Henkin, The Constitution
and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 853 (1987) [hereinafter Henkin, Chinese Exclusion and Progeny]; Louis
Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad
and at Our Gates, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 11 (1985) [hereinafter Henkin, Constitution
as Compact]; Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1197 (1996)
[hereinafter Neuman, Anomalous Zones]; Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?,
100 Yale L.J. 909 (1991). Statutory questions of extraterritoriality have received more
attention, much of it devoted to when and where extraterritorial application of U.S.
statutes ought to occur. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of
Antitrust Laws: The United States and European Community Approaches, 33 Va. J.
Int'l L. 1 (1992); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational
Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 5 (2003); Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of
U.S. Law, 24 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1 (1992); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial
Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 505 (1997);
William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
Berkeley J. Int'l L. 85 (1998); Stephen B. Moldof, The Application of U.S. Labor
Laws to Activities and Employees Outside the United States, 17 Lab. Law. 417 (2002);
Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment, Extraterritoriality and the Corporate Governance
Law, 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 289 (2003). Domestic law also has spatial assumptions that I
do not pursue here. See, e.g., The Legal Geographies Reader: Law, Power, and Space
(Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
This Article explores legal spatiality and its contemporary
implications. As I will show, there are persuasive reasons to take
spatial location into account when interpreting legal rules. Current
doctrine, however, does a poor job of accounting for these reasons
and provides no coherent and consistent theory of the role of
spatiality within our legal order. The last century has witnessed a
progressive relaxing of legal spatiality. Yet with regard to noncitizens,
the federal courts continue to cling to the notion that American law is
tethered to territory-that simply by moving an individual around in
space, the rights that individual enjoys wax and wane. This Article
argues that this strictly territorial approach ought to be rejected.
Instead, the spatial reach of legal rules ought to be evaluated
functionally and flexibly, with a rebuttable presumption that when
legal power is brought to bear, so too are legal protections. This is not
to suggest that territorial borders do not matter: They clearly do.
Rather, my claim is that a narrow fixation on sovereignty and
territoriality is at odds with contemporary concepts of jurisdiction,
with the intensifying trend of globalization, and with our most
cherished principles of constitutionalism.
The Article proceeds as follows. After briefly describing the roots
of legal spatiality in the deep structure of the international legal
system, I analyze the evolution of legal spatiality across a number of
doctrinal areas. These areas are rarely considered together, but all
implicate legal spatiality in one way or another. They also
demonstrate that legal spatiality has been substantially transformed in
the last century. I then look at the particularities of the connection
between Guantanamo and the United States and critique the position
that conceptions of territoriality and sovereignty or the Guantanamo
lease agreement somehow bar the application of those legal rights
noncitizens possess when held within the fifty states. Finally, I
consider some alternative conceptualizations of legal spatiality, and
argue that spatial location ought not woodenly foreclose the existence
of constitutional rights for noncitizens subject to American power
outside the boundaries of the United States.
I. THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF LEGAL SPATIALITY
In several recent cases, federal courts have faced the question of
whether noncitizen detainees held outside U.S. territory by the U.S.
government could challenge their detention via the writ of habeas
corpus.14 In Al Odah v. United States, the predicate case to Rasul, the
14. Al Odah involved twelve Kuwaiti nationals detained in Guantanamo. Al
Odah, 321 F.3d at 1136. Rasul involved two British and one Australian detained in
Guantanamo. Id. at 1136-37. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Appeals
consolidated the two cases. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1134; see Diane Marie Amann,
Guantdnamo, 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 263 (2004) (discussing constitutional as well
as international law arguments). One of the more interesting aspects of the U.S.
[Vol. 732504
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled the Guantanamo
detainees could not. 5 In January of this year, Judge Leon of the U.S.
District Court for the District of D.C. similarly ruled that the
petitioners "lack any viable theory under the United States
Constitution to challenge the lawfulness of their continued detention
at Guantanamo."' 6  The reason, in short, is that "[n]on-[r]esident
[a]liens [c]aptured and [d]etained [o]utside the United States [h]ave
[n]o [c]ognizable [c]onstitutional [r]ights."' 7 The decisions to deny
these habeas petitions reflect fundamental ideas about territory,
sovereignty, and constitutionalism. It is critical at the outset to
underscore a fundamental idea not implicated: that wartime itself
blocks enemy aliens' access to U.S. courts.
Wartime plainly provides a very important context to any case
involving aliens, friendly or otherwise. The President wields
extraordinary powers during war. 8 But whatever the nature of the
current conflict, the Supreme Court has previously made clear that
enemy aliens detained by the United States within American territory
may in fact avail themselves of the judicial process. 9 That the
petitioners in the Guantanamo cases are enemy aliens is itself unclear.
Defining the category of enemy alien in the age of al-Qaeda is
undoubtedly complex. But the petitioners in Rasul, for example, were
not enemy aliens as that term is traditionally understood. They are
citizens of Australia, the United Kingdom, and Kuwait-all close
allies of the United States.20  (The United States argues that the
Guantanamo detainees nonetheless qualify as enemy aliens "because
they were seized in the course of active and ongoing hostilities against
United States and coalition forces.") 21 Most significantly, however,
Supreme Court litigation is the amicus brief filed by the military lawyers charged with
the defense of Guantanamo detainees before American military tribunals. See Jeffrey
Toobin, Inside the Wire: Can an Air Force Colonel Help the Detainees at
Guantanamo?, New Yorker, Feb. 9, 2004, at 36, 39.
15. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1145.
16. Khalid v. Bush, Nos. 1:04-1142, 1:04-1166, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749, at *30
(D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2005).
17. Id. at *21.
18. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law 161-
273 (2003).
19. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1942); see also Brief Amici Curiae of Legal
Historians Listed Herein in Support of the Petitioners at 20-26, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.
Ct. 2686 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343) (arguing that traditional practice both in
England and in the early American republic permitted aliens, enemy or friendly,
access to the writ of habeas corpus).
20. See generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 953 (2002). U.S.
officials in Guantanamo have acknowledged that some of the detainees likely have no
connection to al-Qaeda or the Taliban. Katherine Q. Seelye, An Uneasy Routine at
Cuba Prison Camp, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2002, at A8 (quoting deputy commander at
Guantanamo).
21. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 14, Rasul (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
The petitioners in Khalid, captured in Bosnia and in Pakistan, hail from Algeria,
France, and Bosnia. Khalid, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749, at *6.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the precedents upon which the D.C. Circuit rested its decision in Al
Odah make clear that the enemy alien designation is unnecessary.
The holding in Johnson v. Eisentrager,2 a World War II era case
heavily relied on by the Bush Administration in the Guantanamo
litigation, "was not dependent on the aliens' status as enemies, but
rather on the aliens' lack of presence inside the sovereign territory of
the United States. '23 Consequently, while the nature of the current
struggle against al-Qaeda and in Afghanistan and Iraq provides a very
important milieu for these cases, the resolution of the question of
habeas corpus-and of the broader question of constitutional rights-
does not wholly or even primarily rest on the exigencies of wartime.
These decisions instead rest on a specific conception of
territoriality. This conception can be stated as follows: The physical
location of an individual determines the legal rules applicable and the
legal rights that individual possesses. In this Article, I refer to this
concept as "legal spatiality." The concept of legal spatiality can
readily be generalized: The scope and reach of the law is connected to
territory, and therefore, spatial location determines the operative
legal regime. More plainly, where you sit determines what rules you
sit under.
Assumptions of legal spatiality suffuse our legal system. As the
D.C. Circuit stated in Al Odah, for example:
We cannot see why, or how, the writ [of habeas corpus] may be
made available to aliens abroad when basic constitutional
protections are not.... If the Constitution does not entitle the
detainees to due process, and it does not, they cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of our courts to test the constitutionality or the legality
of restraints on their liberty.2 4
According to this view, the protections of the Bill of Rights are not
untethered from the territory of the United States. Rather, they are
spatially bound: operative only within the fifty states and other
territories unequivocably possessed by the United States. Since the
petitioners are aliens outside the territorial borders of the United
22. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
23. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 13, Rasul (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
Judge Leon's decision in Khalid echoes this, stating that "nothing in Rasul alters the
holding articulated in Eisentrager and its progeny." Khalid, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
749, at *27. See also the Ninth Circuit's statement in Gherebi:
The dispositive issue, for purposes of this appeal, as the government
acknowledges, relates to the legal status of Guantanamo, the site of
petitioner's detention....
.. [T]he government does not dispute that if Gherebi is being detained
on U.S. territory, jurisdiction over his habeas petition will lie, whether or not
he is an "enemy alien."
Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 2003).
24. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
2506 [Vol. 73
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States,' they lack the constitutional protections they uncontestedly
would enjoy were they within our borders.26 In deciding in favor of
the detainees in Rasul, the Supreme Court did not so much as
challenge this set of assumptions as sidestep them. The Court's
holding rested on the particular language of the federal habeas
statute, which, said the majority, does not distinguish between citizens
and aliens. Since citizens can clearly petition for habeas relief from
Guantanamo, so-as a matter of statutory right-can aliens.27 In so
ruling, the Rasul Court distinguished earlier and arguably contrary
precedents on the ground that underlying understandings of the reach
of the habeas statute had changed in recent years. 28 The result was a
victory for the Rasul detainees, but one that does not challenge in any
fundamental way prevailing conceptions of legal spatiality.29
25. As I describe below, while territoriality is critical to the D.C. Circuit's decision
in Al Odah, so is alienage. See infra note 176 and accompanying text. As even the
dissent in Rasul notes, federal courts would have habeas jurisdiction over an
American citizen imprisoned in Guantanamo as a constitutional as well as a statutory
matter. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2686 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. A flurry of scholarship on the Constitution's territorial reach occurred in the
wake of the Spanish-American War. See, e.g., Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of
Our New Possessions-A Third View, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 155 (1899); see also infra Part
II.B (discussing the Constitution's territorial reach). The question popped up
throughout the twentieth century in the law reviews. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Some
New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 Stan. L. Rev. 587 (1949);
Sedgwick W. Green, Applicability of American Laws to Overseas Areas Controlled by
the United States, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1955). There is an extensive literature
devoted to Puerto Rico's status in particular. See, e.g., Foreign in a Domestic Sense:
Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution (Christina Duffy Burnett &
Burke Marshall eds., 2001) [hereinafter Foreign in a Domestic Sense].
27. Implicit in this is the notion that the default assumption in interpreting a
statute silent on the distinction between citizens and aliens is to assume no distinction.
28. Specifically, the majority argued that despite the language of the statute
suggesting that a detainee must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the district
court receiving the petition, in fact, if the custodian is within that district, that is
sufficient. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2695.
29. This is evidenced by the flat assertion in Khalid that "[n]on-[r]esident [a]liens
[c]aptured and [d]etained [o]utside the United States [h]ave [nlo [c]ognizable
[c]onstitutional [r]ights." Khalid v. Bush, Nos. 1:04-1142, 1:04-1166, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 749, at *21 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2005). The Supreme Court has left the door open
for the claim that some constitutional rights may be available to aliens outside the
United States, though it has not clarified the issue. In Zadvydas v. Davis, for
example, the Court stated: "It is well established that certain constitutional
protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens
outside of our geographic borders. But once an alien enters the country, the legal
circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the
United States... ." Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citations omitted).
The Court's invocation of "certain constitutional protections" at least suggests that
other such rights may be available to aliens outside the borders of the United States.
For example, in the area of personal jurisdiction, extraterritorial rights exist for
foreign nationals. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, for example, awards
some level of due process rights to noncitizens abroad. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Consider also the holding of the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Davis: "In order to apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute
to a defendant consistently with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus between
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
A. Historical Foundations
The importance of place to legal rules and protections-the belief
that law derives from land-has deep historical roots. Defining law in
spatial terms accords with the traditional conception of the
Westphalian sovereign state. Legal spatiality concurs as well with
commonplace intuitions about the territorial nature of governance,
which reflect the continuing dominance of the Westphalian model in
contemporary political thinking.30 The Treaty of Westphalia, penned
in 1648, ended the Thirty Years War and is generally credited with
ushering out the medieval system of overlapping loyalties and
allegiances in Europe, and heralding a new system of political rule
based on territoriality and absolute secular power.31 The Westphalian
conception of the state represented a break with the past because it
drew all legitimate power into a single sovereign, who controlled
absolutely a defined territory and its associated population.32 That
defined territory demarcated, for most purposes, the reach of the
sovereign's law.
The Westphalian ideal of statehood is thus fundamentally a spatial
conception of sovereignty. Sovereignty and territoriality in turn
provided the bedrock principles for the development of international
law in the Westphalian era. As John Herz writes:
From territoriality resulted the concepts and institutions which
characterized the interrelations of sovereign units, the modern state
system.... Only to the extent that it reflected their territoriality and
took into account their sovereignty could international law develop
in modern times. For its general rules and principles deal primarily
with the delimitation of the jurisdiction of countries.... [S]overeign
units must know in some detail where their jurisdictions end and
those of other units begin; without such standards, nations would be
the defendant and the United States, so that such application would not be arbitrary
or fundamentally unfair." United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990)
(citation omitted).
30. As David Johnson and David Post write, "[tierritorial borders, generally
speaking, delineate areas within which different sets of legal rules apply. There has
until now been a general correspondence between borders drawn in physical space...
and borders in 'law space."' David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders- The
Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367, 1368 (1996).
31. Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History
509-19 (2003); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999); Leo
Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948,42 Am. J. Int'l L. 20 (1948).
32. The fullness of the break is generally overstated, but it is nonetheless
conventional to refer to the Treaty of Westphalia this way. See Krasner, supra note
31, at 3; Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty (2001); Kal Raustiala, Rethinking
the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. Int'l Econ. L. 841, 857-62
(2003).
[Vol. 732508
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involved in constant strife over the implementation of their
independence.
33
Westphalian sovereignty thus creates a system in which legal
jurisdiction is congruent with sovereign territorial borders. 34  This
territorial form of sovereignty became supreme in Europe and the
greater Christian world throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Broadly speaking, by the nineteenth century, each
sovereign state35 was understood to "possess[] and exercise[] exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction throughout the full extent of its
territory.... [N]o State can, by its laws, directly affect, bind, or
regulate property beyond its own territory, or control persons who do
not reside within it, whether they be native-born subjects or not. 3 6
This understanding of sovereignty and territoriality provided the basis
not only for nineteenth-century international relations, but also for
relations among the constituent states of the United States. Justice
Joseph Story's highly influential approach to jurisdiction drew directly
upon Westphalian territorial principles.37 One need only read Justice
Stephen Johnson Field's opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff s to see the
connection between Westphalian territorial sovereignty as understood
in international law and the prevailing jurisdictional principles of
nineteenth-century American law.39
33. John H. Herz, Rise and Demise of the Territorial State, 9 World Pol. 473, 480-
81 (1957). Likewise, Stephen Krasner argues that Westphalian sovereignty is "an
institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on two principles:
territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures."
Krasner, supra note 31, at 20. One eminent scholar notes that "[t]he original
conception of law was personal, and it was only the rise of the modern territorial State
that subjected aliens-even when they happened to be resident in a State not their
own-to the law of that State." J. L. Brierly, The 'Lotus' Case, 44 Law Q. Rev. 154,
156 (1928).
34. Miles Kahler calls this "jurisdictional congruence." Miles Kahler, Introduction
to Territoriality and Conflict in an Age of Globalization (Miles Kahler & Barbara
Walter eds., forthcoming 2006) (manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter
Territoriality and Conflict].
35. Many political entities were not considered sovereign states under the
international law of the time because they were not deemed "civilized" under the
then-prevailing "standard of 'civilization."' Gerrit W. Gong, China's Entry into
International Society, in The Expansion of International Society 171, 172 (Hedley Bull
& Adam Watson eds., 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter
International Society].
36. Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law § 78 (Richard Henry Dana,
Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 8th ed. 1866) (internal quotations omitted).
37. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court
Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241, 259 ("Story borrowed from Huber the idea of the
exclusivity of sovereign authority.").
38. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
39. Justice Stephen Johnson Field relied heavily on Story in writing his opinion.
See Hazard, supra note 37, at 262 ("There is no question, however, that Story
influenced Pennoyer v. Neff itself."); see also Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722 ("[E]very State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory.... [T]he laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory ....").
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To be sure, the ideal of Westphalian territorial sovereignty was
riddled with exceptions from the beginning.4" An ancient example,
dating to the Renaissance, is the embassy. As Garrett Mattingly
recounts:
[T]he late medieval civilians had worked out a pretty consistent
theory of diplomatic immunity. While an ambassador was on
mission his person was inviolable, and he, his suite and his goods
enjoyed a wide immunity from any form of civil or criminal action,
either in the country where he was accredited or in any through
which he might pass.
Ambassadorial residences have traditionally been treated as within
the jurisdiction of the ambassador's state, though they physically exist
within the host state's borders.42 Perhaps equally ancient is the notion
that sovereigns enjoy universal jurisdiction with regard to piracy on
the high seas-which by definition occurs beyond their territory.43
Another related pre-Westphalian practice was the existence of
sanctuaries: zones, such as monasteries, that were plainly within a
prince's territorial realm yet into which secular law could not reach.
Sanctuary was akin, in a broad sense, to the practice of embassies in
that both were physical locations carved out of a larger territorial
entity and treated distinctly by the law.'
Territorial sovereignty was thus never a hard and fast rule.
Numerous exceptions to strict territoriality existed and even thrived.45
States have long sought to penetrate the territorial sovereignty of
other states even as they sought to protect their own territory from
incursion. Imperialism, in which one polity's territory is absorbed into
or ruled by another, is perhaps the most striking example. Overt
imperial possessions are today rarely sought. Indeed, few colonies
exist today: Since the mid-twentieth century, formal empire has been
devalorized, though many would contend that the United States
continues to maintain-in part through its extraterritorial legal
40. See Krasner, supra note 31, at 24-25.
41. Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy 269 (Butler & Tanner Ltd. ed.
1963).
42. Lori Fisler Damrosch et al., International Law: Cases and Materials 1284 (4th
ed. 2001); see also Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional
Protocol on Disputes, done Apr. 18, 1961, art. 22, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3237-38, 500
U.N.T.S. 96, 106 (guaranteeing that embassy land shall be inviolable). Embassies fit
within the contours of Neuman's concept of "anomalous zones": geographic areas "in
which certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as embodying fundamental policies of
the larger legal system, are locally suspended." Neuman, Anomalous Zones, supra
note 13, at 1201. Neumann offers several examples, of which the naval base at
Guantanamo is one. The others include the District of Columbia, and less formally,
red light zones such as Storyville in New Orleans.
43. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal
Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45 Harv. Int'l L.J. 183 (2004).
44. See Neuman, Anomalous Zones, supra note 13, at 1206-07.
45. This is the primary claim of Krasner. See Krasner, supra note 31, at 24-25.
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assertions-an informal empire, an empire, in Samuel Huntington's
words, "of functions, not territory.., characterized not by the
acquisition of new territory but by their penetration."46 While direct
imperialism was common among the great powers, sovereign states
after Westphalia also maintained a keen interest in their subjects or
citizens who happened to be outside their borders in independent
polities.47  Prior to World War II, western powers regularly
maintained "consular courts" within non-western nations such as
Turkey, Morocco, and China.48 These courts, typically founded on
coercive treaties, adjudicated claims among western citizens abroad as
well as between western citizens and locals, on the theory that the
local law was barbaric, unpredictable, and strange. In other words,
westerners in places like Shanghai lived under their home state's laws
(or an amalgam of western laws) rather than Chinese law-a
profound violation of Westphalian territorial principles.49 In the early
twentieth century, Congress even created a special "U.S. District
Court for China," which answered to the Ninth Circuit." This court
lasted well into the twentieth century, and it was only in 1956 that the
United States finally abandoned consular jurisdiction in a foreign
state. 1
B. Extraterritoriality Today
Since the close of the Second World War, "unequal treaties" have
been frowned upon and consular courts no longer exist. While the
demise of nineteenth-century extraterritorial jurisdiction is a
testament to the enduring power of Westphalian sovereignty,
territorial sovereignty has nonetheless been gradually eroding across
many other fronts. States today regularly and increasingly assert
prescriptive jurisdiction beyond their territorial limits. This is often
done via regulatory statutes (discussed further below) but perhaps
most notably in military deployments abroad, which commonly
employ "Status of Forces Agreements" that alter host state legal
46. Samuel P. Huntington, Transnational Organizations in World Politics, 25
World Pol. 333, 343-44 (1973).
47. Indeed, one of the five well-accepted heads of jurisdiction to prescribe is the
nationality principle. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 402(2) (1987).
48. Eileen P. Scully, Bargaining with the State from Afar 65-66 (2001); Thomas
Naff, The Ottoman Empire and the European States System, in International Society,
supra note 35, at 143, 157-58.
49. Of course, among themselves, the western powers would never permit such an
intrusion into their territorial sovereignty. It was only permissible because these
states were deemed "uncivilized." See David P. Fidler, The Return of the Standard of
Civilization, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 137 (2001) (discussing the standard of civilization).
50. See Scully, supra note 48, at 6. Congress would later create a similar court for
the Panama Canal Zone, answering to the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Egle v. Egle, 715
F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1983).
51. The last American consular court was in Morocco, and was disbanded in 1956.
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regimes in certain respects with regard to foreign service members.52
The United States, with its far-flung force commitments, relies upon
these agreements extensively. (Significantly, the only U.S. military
bases that do not employ such agreements are the base at
Guantanamo Bay and those bases in Iraq which remain from the US
occupation.) The U.S.-Japan agreement, for instance, states that "the
military authorities of the United States shall have the right to
exercise within Japan all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction
conferred on them by the law of the United States over all persons
subject to the military law of the United States."53  Principles of
international law limit these varied extraterritorial assertions but do
not prohibit them. Territoriality and nationality remain the principal
bases of prescriptive jurisdiction, but these bases are subject to
contextual considerations such as fairness and reasonableness. 4 It is
also now generally accepted that states may regulate extraterritorial
acts that have effects within their territory, and, at times, may regulate
acts against their nationals who are abroad." States may even assert
universal jurisdiction beyond the traditional area of piracy. Some
acts, such as genocide, are held to be so heinous that any state may
prosecute the perpetrator.5 6
Each of these examples-and there are others-illustrates that
while Westphalian territorial sovereignty remains an important ideal,
geographic borders in fact coincide quite imperfectly with the reach of
national laws. An increasingly interdependent and globalized world
has rendered strict territorial limits on jurisdiction increasingly
unworkable, just as increasing national unity in the United States led
to the demise of the nineteenth-century rules of personal jurisdiction.
The result of this evolution is that where one sits does not necessarily
determine what legal rules one sits under. As the Supreme Court
52. See GlobalSecurity.org, Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA), at
www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sofa.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2005)
(describing these agreements); see also infra note 82 and accompanying text
(discussing regulatory statutes).
53. Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security: Facilities and Areas and the Status of the United States Armed Forces in
Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, U.S.-Japan, art. 17, 11 U.S.T. 1652, 1664; see also United States v.
Corey, 232 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000) (involving civilian employee of military forces in
Japan).
54. See Restatement, supra note 47, §§ 402-03; see also David J. Gerber, Beyond
Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach of National Laws, 10 Yale J.
Int'l L. 185 (1984).
55. This is known as passive personality jurisdiction. See Restatement, supra note
47, § 402 cmt. g.
56. Traditionally, universal jurisdiction was limited to piracy, but its scope has
expanded in recent decades, though not uncontroversially. See Princeton Project on
Universal Jurisdiction, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (2001);
Kontorovich, supra note 43; Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A
Postmortem, 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 888 (2003); Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of
Universal Jurisdiction, Foreign Aff., July-Aug. 2001, at 86.
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made clear a decade ago in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,
sitting in London and dutifully abiding by English competition law
provides no insulation from the reach of U.S. competition law when
effects on U.S. markets can be demonstrated-even if the actors in
question are British citizens or corporations. 7 The United States has
many statutes that explicitly assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, and
others that do not but have been so construed by the Executive
branch and the courts.58 Other states have done the same.59 While
such assertions of extraterritoriality are ever more common, in some
cases, spatial location itself becomes hard to determine-as in many
recent Internet cases.6°  As technology evolves, legal spatiality
becomes harder to apply and, increasingly, harder to justify as a
jurisprudential principle.
In sum, legal spatiality has deep conceptual roots. It is part and
parcel of the Westphalian model of sovereignty that undergirds the
modern territorial state system. In practice, however, the spatial basis
of Westphalian sovereignty has never been absolute and is
increasingly compromised. Sovereignty, as I demonstrate below, has
become progressively "unbundled" from territoriality.6  This
unbundling, while uneven, can be detected in myriad areas of the law.
II. SPATIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW
The law has long looked to spatiality as a principle or guide for
decisions.62 Courts traditionally derived jurisdiction from principles of
territoriality (though personality-in the form of citizenship-never
57. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). See generally
Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire
Case, 1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 289.
58. See Born, supra note 13; Dodge, supra note 13; Larry Kramer, Vestiges of
Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 179.
59. However, they have generally done so less aggressively. See, e.g., David J.
Gerber, The Extraterritorial Application of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 Am. J. Int'l
L. 756 (1983).
60. Compare Patricia L. Bellia, Chasing Bits Across Borders, 2001 U. Chi. Legal F.
35, with Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border
Searches, 2001 U. Chi. Legal F. 103. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, The
Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 (2002) (providing an extensive
overview of jurisdictional issues and globalization). The problem of locating an act in
space was at the heart of choice of law. Before the rise of the governmental interests
analysis associated with Brainerd Currie, the dominant approach was one of vested
rights, in which wrongful conduct in one state would, if adjudicated in another, have
to follow the first state's laws. This approach is most famously associated with Joseph
Beale. See generally Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws 11-46 (2d ed. 1995); Kramer,
supra note 58.
61. I take the unbundling phrase from John Ruggie. See, e.g., John Gerard
Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International
Relations, 47 Int'l Org. 139 (1993).
62. See Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality: International Relations &
American Law, in Territoriality and Conflict, supra note 34 (discussing similar themes
that are tracked and condensed in this part).
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went away as a head of jurisdiction).63  Consequently, in the
nineteenth century, assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction were,
outside of the context of pirates and consular courts in "uncivilized"
states, quite uncommon.' Courts of the time viewed the notion that
one state could impose its laws within another state's territory as
highly dubious and even dangerous. This conception of legal
spatiality, in which Westphalian territoriality was the operative
principle, was manifested in a number of legal domains.
A. Statutory Law
In 1909, the Supreme Court first addressed the spatial limitations of
federal regulatory law.65 The specific question was whether the
Sherman Antitrust Act applied to actions overseas that impacted U.S.
markets. The American Banana Company sued the United Fruit
Company, arguing that it had been injured by actions undertaken at
the behest of United Fruit in Panama. American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co. provided an early opportunity to consider the nature
of the linkages among territory, jurisdiction, and regulation in the new
era of a more economically-interventionist state. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, writing for the Court, argued that U.S. courts lacked
jurisdiction because U.S. law did not reach into the territories of other
sovereign states. Holmes declared the following:
No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to
no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such
countries may treat some relations between their citizens as
governed by their own law, and keep to some extent the old notion
of personal sovereignty alive.
66
Holmes was referring to the consular jurisdiction still common at the
start of the twentieth century.67 In such aberrant situations, a civilized
state like the United States could extend its law into the territory of
another sovereign. But, he insisted,
the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act
as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done.... For another jurisdiction, if it
should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its
own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not
63. As Justice Robert Jackson notes in Eisentrager, this concept "was old when
Paul invoked it in his appeal to Caesar." See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769
(1950).
64. See supra Part I.
65. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); see also Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International
Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 Recueil des Cours 311, 376-79
(1979).
66. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 355-56.
67. See Scully, supra note 48, at 163-64.
2514 [Vol. 73
THE GEOGRAPHY OF JUSTICE
only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the
authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations .... 68
United States law, in short, did not apply to acts that occurred
abroad because the geographic scope of national law was defined by
territorial borders. Under the spatial assumptions of the time, only
within a sovereign's territory could the sovereign's law apply, absent
very special circumstances, such as activity on the high seas.6 9 Over
the course of the twentieth century, this strict conception of legal
spatiality gradually gave way. As early as the 1920s, regulatory cases
began to chip away at the spatial assumptions of American Banana."
At about the same time, the Supreme Court also recognized that
Westphalian territoriality was problematic in criminal cases when the
statutes in question are "not logically dependent on their locality for
the Government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of
the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud
wherever perpetrated."'" And by 1945, Judge Learned Hand, in a
landmark opinion, enunciated the so-called "effects test," by which
acts that had effects within the United States but occurred abroad
were fair game for U.S. law.72 In other words, the conception of legal
spatiality articulated in American Banana radically shifted within a
few decades. The doctrinal reversal is now so complete that, recently,
the D.C. Circuit went so far as to hold that even foreign plaintiffs
could sue foreign defendants under the Sherman Act for harms that
occurred overseas, as long as some harmful effect was felt within the
United States.73 In other areas of regulation, the United States is
equally aggressive in projecting its regulatory powers beyond its
borders. In 1985, the Securities and Exchange Commission created a
special office solely devoted to international enforcement matters.74
68. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 356 (citations omitted).
69. On the high seas, of course, no other sovereign could object. Similar logic was
at play in the decision in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, involving the
application of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") to Antarctica.
There, the D.C. Circuit held that NEPA did apply. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey,
986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Sean D. Murphy ed., Contemporary Practice of
the United States Relating to International Law, 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 962 (2003).
Subsequent cases held that NEPA did not apply to U.S. military bases abroad, in part
due to foreign policy concerns raised by the presence of another sovereign. See, e.g.,
NEPA Coalition v. Aspen, 837 F. Supp. 466, 467-68 (D.D.C. 1993).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
71. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
72. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see also
Lowenfeld, supra note 65, at 373-411.
73. This holding was reversed by the Supreme Court. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004). While the Justice Department has long
supported such extraterritorial assertions, it opposed the D.C. Circuit's holding before
the Supreme Court.
74. Ethan Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S.
Criminal Justice Enforcement 3 (1993).
2005] 2515
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Many other agencies have done the same.75 In essence, the Executive
branch has endeavored, and the federal courts have permitted the
United States to "set the competitive ground rules for the world
economy" even where other major economies have sizeable and
perhaps disproportionate stakes. 76  And in the criminal law, the
United States frequently asserts jurisdiction over a wide range of
crimes that occur abroad but, like cartels abroad, have effects on the
United States. In some cases, these extraterritorial assertions pertain
to criminal acts that once occurred solely domestically. But in many,
the crimes themselves are relatively new: insider trading, money
laundering, computer fraud, terrorism, and the like.77
Similar moves to decouple law and location were afoot in domestic
understandings of jurisdiction during the early twentieth century. As
the American economy increasingly nationalized in the 1930s and
1940s, and legal realism grew ascendant, "minimum contacts" with a
state by an out-of-state entity became sufficient to justify assertions of
jurisdiction.78  The strict territoriality of Pennoyer, based on Story's
interpretation of the underlying principles of territorial sovereignty
within the law of nations, yielded by 1945 to the functionalism of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.79 International Shoe replaced
"the strict territorial theory" of Pennoyer with "a single overriding
principle: that a state court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant if he has 'certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."'8 °  In short, judges in the mid-twentieth
century increasingly embraced a set of pragmatic, instrumental, and
contextual considerations that, while not ignoring spatial location,
acknowledged the profound changes in the national, and global,
75. Often, these efforts occur with the close assistance of counterpart regulators
abroad. See generally Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int'l L. 1
(2002).
76. Dam, supra note 57, at 294-95.
77. Nadelmann, supra note 74, at 1.
78. George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001
Sup. Ct. Rev. 347, 348 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
79. 326 U.S. at 310; see also Hazard, supra note 37, at 272. The Court in Pennoyer
had stated that it was a universal principle that
[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial
limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise
authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum, as has
been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted
as mere abuse.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). By the 1980s, the Supreme Court made
clear that foreign defendants with no connection to the United States had Fourteenth
Amendment rights. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987).
80. Rutherglen, supra note 78, at 348 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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economy and the decreasing significance of space to sovereign
control.8
By the 1960s, the United States was routinely asserting
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction based on the effects concept
under a number of different regulatory statutes.82 Legal spatiality
again yielded to functional considerations of effects on markets.
Courts no longer argued that one sovereign could not invade
another's territory with its law, as Holmes had stated so emphatically
in 1909. Rather, from the 1950s onward, courts simply looked to what
Congress intended in a given statute and found-at least in many
areas of economic regulation-that Congress intended to regulate
globally. A "presumption against extraterritoriality" in ambiguous
cases remains, but frequently, that presumption is readily rebutted.83
Foreign states have complained vociferously about the United States'
aggressive extraterritoriality, but this has had little impact on the
trend.84
B. Constitutional Claims
Much like regulatory law during the era of American Banana, legal
spatiality was central to considerations of constitutional law in the
nineteenth century. Here too, decisions reflected Story's
understanding-derived from international law principles-of the
spatial limits of sovereignty. Courts of the time viewed the
Constitution as operative only within the acknowledged territory of
the United States.85 Outside the United States, the Constitution had
no force. This position was laid out squarely in 1891 in In re Ross,86 a
case that set the doctrinal pattern for nearly seventy years. In Ross,
the Supreme Court faced the question of whether the Constitution
applied to trials by U.S. consular courts of American citizens abroad.87
81. See Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A
Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1987,
at 11 (discussing developments in conflicts of laws and in U.S. foreign relations law
pertaining to extraterritoriality); Lowenfeld, supra note 65; Raustiala, supra note 75
(discussing the causality behind this shift).
82. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
83. See Born, supra note 13; Dodge, supra note 13.
84. See, e.g., Alan C. Swan & John F. Murphy, Cases and Materials on the
Regulation of International Business and Economic Relations 905 (2d ed. 1999)
(discussing the Sherman Act). "Almost without exception our friends are particularly
offended by what they consider the readiness of the United States to engage in
extraterritorial application of what, to many, is a wholly idiosyncratic body of law."
Id.
85. As discussed below, this question of what territory was actually U.S. territory
for constitutional purposes was hotly debated but not easily answered. See infra text
accompanying notes 86-98.
86. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
87. Id. at 463. In fact, Ross was not a U.S. citizen. Id. at 462. But since he was
working on a U.S. ship, he was constructively a citizen for the purposes of this case.
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These consular courts, discussed above, operated extraterritorially
and were clearly and uncontestedly an arm of the U.S. government.
Ross involved a sailor who was convicted of murder by a U.S.
consular court sitting in Japan. Ross appealed on the grounds that the
consular court-the local consul sitting in judgment-violated his
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. But the Supreme Court
emphatically rejected the idea that a U.S. court located abroad could
possibly violate the protections of the Constitution. This was
impossible, the Court said, because "[t]he Constitution can have no
operation in another country.'""S As in American Banana, territory and
sovereignty were declared to be inseparable and coterminous. Since
the Constitution was spatially bound, Ross, regardless of his
citizenship, had no constitutional rights outside U.S. territory. (The
Supreme Court did not, however, invalidate the existence of the
consular court. How a U.S. court acquired the power to operate in
Japan, given this conceptualization of legal spatiality, was never
adequately explained.)8 9
The Supreme Court's decision in Ross defined the legal landscape
with regard to spatiality and constitutional rights for decades.9" Yet by
the middle of the twentieth century, the view that the Constitution's
legal protections stopped at the water's edge began to be
reconsidered, just as it had been reconsidered in the area of statutory
law. That constitutional powers were not spatially limited was never
in doubt. What was at issue now, rather, was whether the
constitutional rights also extended beyond the borders of the United
States. A 1953 case, for example, held that the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment applied to takings by the U.S. government of
property located abroad, despite the government's claim that the
constitutional right to just compensation was spatially bound.9 Then,
Reid v. Covert,92 a 1957 case involving the murder in the United
Kingdom of a U.S. air force officer by his wife, rejected in a sweeping
manner the prevailing spatial theory of constitutional rights. Reid
The decision makes clear that constructive citizenship does not alter the outcome of
the case in any way. Id. at 464.
88. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
89. The majority argued essentially that Japan's acquiescence permitted the
United States to operate there, but that does not directly answer the question of the
constitutional power to create and operate an instrumentality of the United States
abroad. Id.
90. I discuss the related Insular Cases below. See infra notes 136-43 and
accompanying text.
91. Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457 (Ct. Cl. 1953). Turney involved
property located in the Philippines. See also Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal
Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1217 (1992)
(discussing other aspects of the Fifth Amendment, and arguing that the due process
analysis that applies to personal jurisdiction extends to the extraterritorial application
of U.S. law).
92. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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established the notion that the protections of the Bill of Rights apply
to U.S. government action wherever it occurs, so long as the
defendant or suspect is a U.S. citizen.93 In so doing, the Court
dramatically altered the prevailing conception of legal spatiality.
In Reid, the civilian defendant, pursuant to a status of forces
agreement with the United Kingdom, was convicted by a U.S. court-
martial. This was a common practice during the Cold War; courts-
martial of dependent civilians occurred daily. As in Ross, the
defendant in Reid challenged her conviction on Sixth Amendment
grounds. The government argued that the Ross rule straightforwardly
rejected her claim. Yet the Reid Court unequivocably rejected the
legal spatiality of Ross. The Court in Reid seemed to find the
underlying territorial logic of Ross, which the government relied upon
in its argument in Reid, abhorrent. Indeed, Justice Black called it "a
relic from a different era."94 More tellingly, the decision stated that
we reject the idea that when the United States acts against citizens
abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The United States is
entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have
no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the
limitations imposed by the Constitution. When the Government
reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill
of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide.., should not
be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.95
As a doctrinal matter, this holding was limited to American citizens.
But the underlying rationale for this limitation was unclear. Ross had
been based on a particular and strict conception of territoriality, in
which law was spatially delimited for citizens and aliens alike. Both
citizens and aliens enjoyed the rights of the Constitution when within
the United States' sovereign territory, and both citizens and aliens lost
those rights when outside that territory. Law and spatial location
were, according to the Ross rule, intrinsically connected.
Consequently, by accepting the idea that the Constitution was not in
fact spatially delimited, in Reid a profound conceptual break occurred.
Why did the Reid Court choose to extend constitutional protections
to citizens without regard to territorial location? Reid certainly seems
reflective of the rising rights consciousness of the 1950s-it was
decided just a few years after Brown v. Board of Education96 and has a
ringing, landmark tone. But it also reflected the realities of the Cold
93. Id. Reid was in certain limited respects presaged by United States v. Belmont,
in which the Court stated that "our Constitution, laws, and policies have no
extraterritorial operation, unless in respect of our own citizens." United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937).
94. Reid, 354 U.S. at 12.
95. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added). The holding of Reid was extended to civilian
employees of the armed services. See Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
96. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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War, which, for the first time, entailed large numbers of U.S. troops
and their dependents stationed for long periods in far-flung corners of
the globe.97 Cognizant of the nearly one million U.S. soldiers and
250,000 civilian dependents stationed abroad, who were, under the
government's theory, effectively without constitutional rights, the
Reid Court declared the Ross version of legal spatiality archaic and
wrong.98 The Constitution was understood in Reid to be a global
document, untethered from the particular soil of the United States. It
was declared to be a constitutive text which, while creating a political
entity also restrained that entity. These elements-both constitutive
and restraining-operated regardless of where the federal government
acted. From now on, courts would have to justify the residual
spatiality of American law-if they chose to justify it-without simple
recourse to the strict territorial principles of the past. The key
distinction they often relied upon was alienage.
C. Citizens and Aliens
Perhaps the most striking example of such an alienage-based
justification of legal spatiality occurred fifteen years ago in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. 9 U.S. courts have traditionally held that
the Fourth Amendment's restraints on search and seizure applied, like
all constitutional rights, to citizens as well as aliens within the United
States. But in Verdugo, the Supreme Court held that a Mexican
citizen's home in Mexico could be searched by U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency officials without a warrant, and the evidence
seized used against that individual in a U.S. court. °0 The defendant
challenged the search on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Ninth
Circuit suppressed the evidence, finding that Mr. Verdugo possessed
Fourth Amendment rights despite the foreign location of the search.
The Supreme Court reversed.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for a plurality in Verdugo,
acknowledged that U.S. courts extend Fourth Amendment protection
to foreigners and their property within our borders. 10 1  But, the
decision argued, it does not follow that they must extend it to an
97. Raustiala, supra note 62.
98. See Supplemental Brief for Appellant and Petitioner on Rehearing at 6-7,
Reid (Nos. 701, 713). Indeed, the language in the decision, read on its own terms,
implies a result far more sweeping than the limited holding to citizens: "The United
States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no
other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution." Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6.
99. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
100. Verdugo also illustrates the rise of international policing by American agents.
Just as the internationalization of production led to an increase in extraterritorial
application of antitrust law, so too have American police officials increasingly worked
with their counterparts abroad. See generally Nadelmann, supra note 74.
101. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 272.
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alien's property outside our borders.10 2 While Reid had established
that the Constitution was no longer spatially bound for citizens, the
Verdugo Court asserted that spatial location was still determinative of
the rights of aliens. The interesting twist was that in Verdugo, the
defendant was actually within American territory at the time of the
search. Having been arrested in Calexico, California and detained in
San Diego, he was unquestionably within the border.'013 His property,
however, was not. For the Court, this spatial fact was critical. Had
the property been in San Diego, but he in Mexico, a warrantless
search would likely have run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. It was
the location of Verdugo's home, not his person, that seems to have
ultimately determined the outcome of the case. °4
This reasoning was significant because, as noted above, U.S. law has
long held that aliens in the United States enjoy many of the same
rights as citizens as a strictly territorial conception of law would
predict.'05 As early as 1886, during the height of strict territoriality,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was held
to apply to a Chinese national present in the United States. 6 As
Verdugo shows, however, despite the demise of strict territoriality
heralded by Reid, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,"7 United
States v. Bowman,108 and other cases, geography is nonetheless a
critical determinant of the rights of aliens. It is true that U.S. law at
times looks to the formal entry of aliens into the United States rather
than pure spatial location.109 In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,
102. Id. at 273-75.
103. Id. at 262. Justice John Paul Stevens's concurrence in Verdugo argued that the
search was governed by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment because the
respondent was "lawfully present in the United States... even though he was brought
and held here against his will." Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring).
104. The plurality responded to the fact that the Fourth Amendment refers to "the
people" by distinguishing Verdugo from the people. According to Chief Justice
William Rehnquist's opinion, the phrase "the people" in the text of the Fourth
Amendment refers to "a class of persons who are part of a national community or
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community." Id. at 265. I discuss this idea further below. See
infra Part IV.B.
105. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). But see Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (holding that the federal government may enact
citizenship requirements that the states may not); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)
(discussing various constitutional provisions that rest on legitimate distinctions
between aliens and citizens). And aliens can of course be deported, whereas citizens
cannot. Louis Henkin discusses the federal power over immigration. See Henkin,
Chinese Exclusion and Progeny, supra note 13.
106. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at
356.
107. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
108. 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
109. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958) (holding that an alien physically
present within the United States was nonetheless not within the United States for
certain statutory purposes).
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for example, the Supreme Court noted that under the Immigration
and Naturalization Act, aliens who were within our territory were
treated "as though they had never entered the United States at all;
they were within the United States territory but not 'within the United
States.' ' ' . And the exact location of the territorial borders of the
United States is occasionally unclear. Shaughnessy v. United States ex
reL Mezei, for example, held that "harborage at Ellis Island is not an
entry into the United States," despite the fact that Ellis Island is
incontrovertibly sovereign U.S. territory.1 ' These exceptions aside,
the general rule of the last 125 years has been that aliens enjoy nearly
all the rights of citizens while within the United States."
2
Whether aliens also enjoy constitutional rights against the U.S.
government when abroad received heightened attention after Reid.
Many commentators at the time suggested, not unreasonably given
the prior parallelism between citizen and alien rights, that they ought
to." 3 Some courts agreed."' In the 1974 case of United States v.
Toscanino, which like Verdugo, involved a Fourth Amendment claim,
the Second Circuit argued that there is no rationale for "a different
rule with respect to aliens who are victims of unconstitutional action
abroad, at least where the government seeks to exploit the fruits of its
unlawful conduct in a criminal proceeding against the alien.""' 5
Even during this pre-Verdugo period, however, the constitutional
rights of aliens abroad did not receive the same vigorous level of
protection as those of citizens." 6  Post-Verdugo, the distinction
between citizen and alien became much sharper. For example, in
United States v. Davis, the Ninth Circuit extended the Verdugo test to
110. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155,175 (1993).
111. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953). Justice
Robert Jackson argued in dissent that the taking of liberty "within the United States
or its territorial waters, may be done only by proceedings which meet the test of due
process of law." Id. at 227 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Insular possessions of the United
States pose another set of problems. See, e.g., Valmonte v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 136 F.3d 914 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that birth in the Philippines
during the territorial era does not constitute birth in the United States under the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, despite the United States'
exercising complete sovereignty over the Philippines); see also infra Part II.D
(discussing further the insular possession of the United States).
112. "[R]elatively little turns on citizenship status. The right to vote and the right to
run for federal elective office are restricted to citizens, but all of the other rights are
written without such limitation." Cole, supra note 20, at 978.
113. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 81; Henkin, Constitution as Compact, supra
note 13; John A. Ragosta, Aliens Abroad: Principles for the Application of
Constitutional Limitations to Federal Action, 17 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 287 (1985);
Roszell Dulany Hunter, IV, Note, The 'Extraterritorial Application of the
Constitution- Unalienable Rights?, 72 Va. L. Rev. 649 (1986).
114. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Berlin
Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976); United States v.
Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
115. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 280.
116. Hunter, supra note 113, at 669.
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searches on the high seas, holding that nonresident aliens on ships in
international waters have no Fourth Amendment protections either." 7
More dramatically, in 2003, United States v. Esparza-Mendoza held
that an excludable criminal alien present in the United States illegally
also lacks Fourth Amendment protections.1 8 The court argued that
such an individual, while clearly within U.S. territory, was not one of
the people as that term was interpreted by the Verdugo Court.
Verdugo was on U.S. territory legally but involuntarily. Esparza-
Mendoza was here illegally but voluntarily. The court held that in
both cases, there was no constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure. This decision, like Verdugo itself,
evinces a move away from a purely spatial understanding of the
Fourth Amendment's scope and toward one that is status-based,
regardless of the locus of the search. Nonetheless, this particular
approach has not (yet) been picked up by other federal courts." 9
The rationale for the continuing commitment to legal spatiality in
the area of alienage is hazy at best given the despatialized vision of the
Constitution announced in Reid. But it is perhaps best understood as
a combination of two ideas: a vestigial notion of legal spatiality-held
over from the nineteenth-century era of strict territoriality- coupled
to the idea that the alien is a guest within the borders of the United
States. Allusions to the guest theory appear frequently in cases
involving aliens. A canonical statement is Justice Jackson's in
Johnson v. Eisentrager: "The alien, to whom the United States has
been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and
ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our
society." 2° Mere presence grants some rights; these rights grow as the
relationship deepens. 21 This conception of rights is frequently cited,
but in fact, it is not especially consistent with American practice. It
does not take numerous years of residence, or even intent to
naturalize, to enjoy many constitutional rights. 22 Aliens who have
spent almost no time in the United States are treated, for most
purposes, the same as those who have lived here for years.
Prior to Reid, the guest theory made some sense, since for all
individuals-citizen or alien-the Constitution was spatially delimited.
Today, however, continued adherence to a guest theory rests on an
117. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990).
118. United States v. Esparza-Mendoza. 265 F. Suon. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003).
119. See United States v. Gorshkov, No. CROO-550C, 2001 WL 1024026, at *1
(W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001) (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the
defendant-alien's property located abroad because the alien's single voluntary entry
into the United States for criminal purposes did not establish the voluntary
community connection demanded by the Verdugo decision).
120. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
121. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 279-80.
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uncertain foundation. It is difficult to discern a coherent underlying
theory that can both cast the Constitution as a document that controls
the exercise of government power wherever that power is exercised,
while at the same time construing it as a document that limits those
controls-which are facially-neutral as to citizenship -only to citizens
when power is exercised outside the territory of the United States.
How, in other words, can spatial location both matter to the reach of
the Constitution and yet not matter? Possible answers exist, of
course, 123 and I address these further below. But the question is not
easy to answer.
In short, while spatial location is now irrelevant to the constitutional
rights of American citizens, that principle has been only unevenly
extended to noncitizens. It has long been true, for instance, that
foreign firms with no presence in the United States have due process
rights, such as the Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of the
jurisdiction of American courts when they lack sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum state. 124 And, as noted above, a handful of
unusual cases over the last forty years have argued that noncitizens
abroad enjoy certain protections of the Constitution. 125  The
Restatement of Foreign Relations (Third), published in 1986-before
the Supreme Court's decision in Verdugo-even went so far as to state
that "at least some actions by the United States in respect of foreign
nationals outside the country are also subject to constitutional
limitations. ' 126  But, the Restatement notes, this "has not been
authoritatively adjudicated," having been neither endorsed by the
Supreme Court nor aggregated to any appreciable pattern. 27 Verdugo
weakened this largely aspirational statement further. Yet while
Verdugo may well stand for the proposition that spatial location
remains essential to the rights of aliens against the U.S. government,
that decision offered no coherent theory for why this was true -when
123. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limits on the Struggle Against
International Terrorism: Revisiting the Rights of Overseas Aliens, 19 Conn. L. Rev.
831 (1987).
124. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)
("The strictures of the Due Process Clause forbid a state court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over Asahi under circumstances that would offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."' (citation omitted)). Indeed, the Asahi Court found
that the defendant's location in Japan was in fact part of the reason the assertion of
jurisdiction was "unreasonable and unfair." Id. at 114, 116.
125. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S.
Ct. Berlin 1979); see also Stephan, supra note 123; supra notes 114-15 and
accompanying text.
126. Restatement, supra note 47, § 722 cmt. m. The Chief Reporter was Louis
Henkin, who has long championed this idea.
127. Id. As one commentator noted (with some understatement) with regard to
the constitutional rights cases, these decisions "form a curious mosaic." Hunter, supra
note 113, at 671.
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territoriality so demonstrably no longer applied to citizens-nor what
might explain the various anomalies in the case law.
D. Indian Country and Insular Possessions
I have discussed the various cases relating to legal spatiality as if the
territorial borders of the United States were clearly demarcated-
which in a sense they are. Yet not all American territory is the same.
For example, since the founding of the Republic, the United States
has treated some areas of its territory as "Indian country": land
partially under the control of Indian tribes. Since John Marshall's
famous opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, tribes were
understood to be semi-sovereign entities; "domestic dependent
nations," in his artful, if confusing, phrase. 12 8 The tribes possess
inherent sovereignty, 129 Marshall said, but that sovereignty is subject
to the sovereignty of the United States. What this exactly means is a
mystery. Though congressional power over the tribes is plenary, the
tribes retain (an increasingly depleted) degree of jurisdiction over
certain internal matters. 30 Until 1924, even birthright citizenship was
not extended to Indians born on reservations, despite the plain
language of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Thus, Indian Country is
distinctive legally even though it is wholly and unquestionably within
the geographic borders of the United States.
Similarly, despite the significant moves away from legal spatiality in
cases such as Reid and Hartford Fire, the Supreme Court has never
retreated from the differential treatment of territory that is ruled by
the United States yet not granted statehood. 32 These territories-
such as Hawaii until 1957 and Puerto Rico today-are constitutionally
distinct from "normal" American territory: the territory of the fifty
states.'33
128. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
129. Id. A core principle of federal Indian law is "that those powers which are
lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers ... but rather
inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."
Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 97 (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian
Law 122 (1942) (quotation marks omitted)).
130. See generally William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law (3d ed. 1998).
131. Paul Brest & Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking
1355 n.3 (3d ed. 1992).
132. The District of Columbia is another example of a constitutional "anomalous
zone," to use Neuman's term. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, supra note 13. Both
Indian country and the territories of the United States fall also within the
congressional plenary power doctrine. See Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 11-38; Sarah
H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1
(2002).
133. See Foreign in a Domestic Sense, supra note 26; Harry N. Scheiber & Jane L.
Scheiber, Bayonets in Paradise: A Half-Century Retrospect on Martial Law in
Hawai'i, 1941-1946, 19 U. Haw. L. Rev. 477 (1997).
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This geographic distinction between states and territories-found in
the Constitution itself 34-first emerged as the United States expanded
westward.'35 But it is most famously associated with the Insular Cases,
involving the imperial possessions acquired by the United States in
the wake of the Spanish-American War.'36 That war marked the
emergence of the United States as a great military and imperial
power. 37 In victory, the United States acquired several overseas
possessions of Spain, in particular, the Philippines. The question of
whether "the Constitution follow[ed] the flag" was hotly debated at
the time.'38 Incorporating the former colonies of Spain meant, in
practice, the unprecedented act of infusing distant, blue water colonies
and a large number of nonwhites into the United States.'39
The Supreme Court answered the question of whether the
Constitution followed the flag by holding that the new territories,
though sovereign U.S. possessions, were distinct from other American
territory. Some fundamental constitutional rights applied in these
regions. But others, such as the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury, did not. In so declaring, the Supreme Court drew a clear
distinction between types of sovereign territory (as well as between
types of rights). The United States is sovereign in both the states and
in its colonies. But the Constitution does not apply fully in the latter.
As Elihu Root famously quipped, "as near as I can make out the
Constitution follows the flag-but doesn't quite catch up with it."' 4 °
The fever for empire in the United States eventually abated, and
the Philippines, Cuba, and other territories were granted
independence during the first half of the twentieth century. The
United States nonetheless retains a vestigial empire: Puerto Rico,
Guam, the Virgin Islands, and so forth. Congress retains plenary
134. The Territories Clause reads as follows: "The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States ...." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
135. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 Cal. L.
Rev. 853 (1990); see also Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution:
Governing Without Authority, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 581 (2001).
136. This phrase refers to several cases involving overseas possessions, beginning
with De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), and ending with Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258
U.S. 298 (1922).
137. "Abroad as well as at home,... 1898-1899 marked the emergence of the
United States as a great power." Ernest R. May, American Imperialism, at ix (Imprint
Publications 1991).
138. Frederick R. Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial
Incorporation, 26 Colum. L. Rev. 823 (1926); Lowell, supra note 26; see also Fairman,
supra note 26.
139. 1 use the term "incorporate" colloquially here; the term "incorporate"
acquired a quite specific and momentous meaning due to its use in the Insular Cases.
Hawaii raised many of the same issues, and became a U.S. state in 1957. See generally
Scheiber & Scheiber, supra note 133.
140. 1 Phillip C. Jessup, Elihu Root 348 (1938) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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powers in insular territories just as it does in Indian Country.' For
example, Congress has extended the full protections of the Bill of
Rights to Puerto Rico by statute. But plenary power dictates that it
can rescind that extension at any time.142 Puerto Ricans do not vote
for President, nor do they have voting representation in Congress.
These distinctions all reflect a conception of legal spatiality in which
the core territory of the sovereign state is distinguishable from the
periphery. The Insular Cases continue to be cited as good authority
for the notion that the United States can constitutionally distinguish
different types of territory.14
3
In short, the odd-or oxymoronic-phrases that U.S. courts have
fashioned to describe Indian Country and insular possessions-
"foreign ... in a domestic sense"; " "domestic dependent
nations"145-starkly highlight the uneasy fit between the Westphalian
conception of absolute territorial sovereignty and the reality of a more
multilayered connection between law and territory. The Insular Cases
have never been repudiated. The ironic-even absurd-result is that
post-Reid, an American citizen appears more firmly protected against
American government action by the Bill of Rights when in Japan than
when in Puerto Rico.146
E. The Uneven Demise of Territoriality
oA century ago, when Guantanamo was first acquired by the United
States, Westphalian territoriality was relatively robust. Exceptions
existed, but they were limited. Today, Westphalian territoriality
persists in many areas, but both constitutional doctrine and statutory
interpretation evidence a marked transformation in legal spatiality.
Territorial location is no longer a bar to constitutional protections for
American citizens. And it is now routine for U.S. statutes to apply to
actions that occur entirely abroad, as long as these actions have effects
in the United States. These changes illustrate how legal doctrine can
evolve to accommodate exogenous changes in context. 147  Yet this
transformation in legal spatiality is decidedly partial. American courts
maintain and occasionally deploy a presumption against
extraterritoriality when interpreting statutes. Insular possessions and
other "anomalous zones" are constitutionally distinct from the fifty
141. Cleveland, supra note 132.
142. Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 89.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Ntreh, 279 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2002); Romeu v. Cohen,
265 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2001).
144. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
145. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
146. "It is hard to see the coherence of an approach that leads to the conclusion
that American citizens cannot be tried by the federal government for capital offenses
without jury trial in Japan but can be so tried in Puerto Rico." Strangers to the
Constitution, supra note 13, at 101.
147. See Raustiala, supra note 62.
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states. 148 And aliens, as discussed above, continue to face geographic
limits to their legal rights.
No one seriously argues that the reach of domestic law ought to be
coterminous with the territorial borders of the sovereign. The
implications are far too radical and frequently unsustainable - as
conflicts scholars in the United States long ago recognized.149 But
while the norm of Westphalian territoriality has endured, in practice,
Westphalian territoriality is increasingly compromised and
anachronistic, and lacks a coherent underlying theory to justify its
continued use as a conclusive jurisdictional principle. There is wide
variation in the treatment of legal spatiality, and this variation
sometimes rests on pragmatic principles. But it frequently rests on
little more than accidents of history and sheer inertia, since the
doctrine has evolved in a haphazard and under-theorized manner over
many decades. The rarity of cases addressing geographical location
leads to a bumpy doctrinal path at best, schizophrenia at worst. 5°
Given this ambivalent relationship between law and territory, the
choice to rely on principles of legal spatiality in contemporary judicial
decision making is not self-evident in any particular case. While
perhaps reasonable in the nineteenth century, when legal spatiality
was treated more coherently, it is insufficient for a court today simply
to point to spatial location as determinative of legal outcomes. 51
Spatial location has a role to play in legal decisions, but that role must
be justified. I explore this role more fully after turning to the
particularities of the American presence in Guantanamo.
III. HABEAS AND THE QUESTION OF GUANTANAMO
Legal spatiality has received little systematic scholarly attention.
The connection between law and land has come into sharp focus,
however, over the issue of the detention of suspected al-Qaeda and
Taliban members in Guantanamo as well as in other, less well-known
facilities in Afghanistan and other foreign locations. 52 In this part, I
148. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, supra note 13.
149. The transition from the approach of Beale to that of Currie makes this clear.
See Brilmayer, supra note 60; Kramer, supra note 58.
150. Some areas of the law have had many cases involving extraterritorial
application; antitrust is an excellent example. See Born, supra note 13; Lowenfeld,
supra note 65, at 373-411.
151. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Khalid v. Bush, Nos.
1:04-1142, 1:04-1166, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2005).
152. See James Risen & Thom Shanker, Hussein Enters Post-9/11 Web of U.S.
Prisons, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2003, at Al. Guantanamo has played a key role in
debates over legal spatiality before. See, for example, the discussion in Haitian
Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary:
It does not appear to us to be incongruous or overreaching to conclude that
the United States Constitution limits the conduct of United States personnel
with respect to officially authorized interactions with aliens brought to and
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briefly survey the history of wartime habeas corpus petitions and their
connection to territory. I then examine the history of the
Guantanamo Naval Base and the complex questions of sovereignty it
raises. All of the overseas American detention facilities implicate
questions of legal spatiality. 53 But because of its unique history,
distinctive prominence, and unusual legal basis, Guantanamo is the
most important and most interesting case.
A. War, Habeas, and Spatiality
The litigation over the Guantanamo detainees has largely turned on
their ability to invoke the writ of habeas corpus in American courts.
In Rasul, the Supreme Court declared the writ available to the
detainees as a matter of statutory law without reaching directly the
question of whether aliens abroad have, as a constitutional matter, a
right to the writ. Yet habeas corpus has significant constitutional
underpinnings. Of ancient lineage in English law, the writ is aimed at
ensuring that the government does not deprive a person of liberty
without providing an adequate legal basis to a court of law."' On its
face, that idea seems unconnected to geographical location. 55 Since
detained by such personnel on a land mass exclusively controlled by the
United States.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1343 (2d Cir. 1992); see also
Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir. 1995) ("The
district court here erred in concluding that Guantanamo Bay was a 'United States
territory.' .. . We disagree that 'control and jurisdiction' is equivalent to
sovereignty.").
153. The facility at Guantanamo is not the only such detention center. Though it
appears to be the largest and is the best-known, the United States has reportedly
created a network of overseas detention centers. In addition, some individuals are
detained by friendly nations, such as Egypt. See Risen & Shanker, supra note 152
(describing the network of prisons run by the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence
Agency in Afghanistan, Thailand, and other undisclosed locations). The Bush
Administration's stated intent is to try many of these detainees via military
commissions. See U.S. Dep't of Def., Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures
for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism (Mar. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf. These trials have
recently begun. Scott Higham, Hearings Open with Challenge to Tribunals, Wash.
Post, Aug. 29, 2004, at A12.
154. "The origins of the writ of habeas corpus in England and the Commonwealth
may be found in Magna Carta." Brief for the Commonwealth Lawyers Association as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitions at 3, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004)
(Nos. 03-334, 03-343); see also Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 1038 (1970).
155. As the commonwealth lawyers' brief in the certiorari petition in Al Odah
explains, "[a]s a matter of English law jurisdiction for the purposes of the writ of
habeas corpus is established when the detained person is placed under the control of
the Crown or enters territory under the Crown's control whether or not the Crown
claims sovereignty over that territory." Brief for the Commonwealth Lawyers
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitions at 8, Rasul (Nos. 03-334, 03-
343).
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the aim of habeas is to constrain executive power, it is not obvious
why it ought to matter where that power is exercised. Indeed, many
scholars contend that English law has long held that habeas does not
turn on the petitioners' locality, but simply on the exercise of state
power. 156
Wartime is nonetheless a special context. 5 The Constitution states
in Article I that "[tlhe Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it. '"158 Consistent with English practice, in
the founding era, noncitizens-even enemy aliens-enjoyed the
protections of habeas corpus. 159 Lincoln (in)famously suspended the
writ during the Civil War."6 The usual starting point for discussion on
the meaning of the suspension clause is Ex parte Milligan, a Civil War
case holding that the military trial of a noncombatant citizen was
unconstitutional while the civilian courts were open and functioning.16" '
The next major milestone occurred during the Second World War, in
156. The writ of habeas corpus was available under the common law whenever the
place in question was "under the subjection of the Crown of England." Brief Amici
Curiae of Legal Historians Listed Herein in Support of the Petitioners at 18, Rasul
(Nos. 03-334, 03-343) (quoting Lord Mansfield's opinion in Rex v. Cowle, 97 Eng.
Rep. 587, 599 (K.B. 1759)). For example, habeas was available in India well before
Britain declared formal sovereignty over parts of India:
Importantly, judicial power to issue writs of habeas corpus in India did not
turn on the existence of formal sovereignty. To the contrary, Britain
intentionally delayed assertions of formal sovereignty over the range of
territories controlled by the [British] East India Company until 1813 -nearly
four decades after judges had begun issuing writs of habeas corpus on behalf
of individuals detained by Company officials in those same lands.
Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
157. See, e.g., Michal R. Belknap, Alarm Bells from the Past: The Troubling
History of American Military Commissions, 28 J. Supreme Ct. Hist. 300 (2003).
158. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9. The writ stands, the Supreme Court has declared, as
"the precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher duty than to
maintain it unimpaired." Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
159. Brief Amici Curiae of Legal Historians Listed Herein in Support of the
Petitioners at 25, Rasul (Nos. 03-334, 03-343) ("Similarly, alleged 'enemy aliens' have
been able to seek review of their legal status on habeas corpus.").
160. Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties
9 (1991). News accounts indicate that the Bush Administration tried, in the USA
Patriot Act, to suspend habeas corpus. Early drafts of the Patriot Act "included a
provision entitled 'Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.' Representative James
Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, later told reporters,
'[t]hat stuck out like a sore thumb. It was the first thing I crossed out."' Petitioners'
Brief on the Merits at 14 n.12, Rasul (No. 03-334) (citing Roland Watson, Bush Law
Chief Tried to Drop Habeas Corpus, Times (London), Dec. 3, 2001, at 14 (alteration
in original)). As the petitioners' brief notes, there is no indication that Congress ever
intended to suspend habeas in the war on terror and indeed this story suggests that it
resisted any such effort by the Executive. See Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 7,
Rasul (No. 03-334).
161. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); see also Neely, supra note 160, at
179-82.
THE GEOGRAPHY OF JUSTICE
the Ex parte Quirin decision. 1 2 Quirin involved an unusual set of
protagonists: German saboteurs who landed on beaches in Florida
and Long Island, changed into civilian clothes, and proceeded to
infiltrate American cities. At least one of the would-be saboteurs was
actually an American citizen. 63 After one of the participants had a
change of heart and alerted the FBI, the saboteurs were imprisoned in
Washington, D.C. and tried by military commission.164
The Supreme Court declared that although the Nazi saboteurs were
avowedly enemy aliens, that status did not foreclose jurisdiction by
U.S. courts. The Roosevelt Administration had argued that the
saboteurs lacked access to American courts. As the Supreme Court
put it (referring to an executive proclamation about the saboteurs
issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt), the U.S. government
insists that petitioners must be denied access to the courts, both
because they are enemy aliens or have entered our territory as
enemy belligerents, and because the President's Proclamation
undertakes in terms to deny such access to the class of persons
defined by the Proclamation.... It is urged that if they are enemy
aliens or if the Proclamation has force no court may afford the
petitioners a hearing.... [N]either the Proclamation nor the fact that
they are enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of
petitioners' contentions that the Constitution and the laws of the
United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military
commission.1
65
The Quirin decision was not aberrational. In In re Yamashita,166 the
Supreme Court similarly reviewed on the merits a habeas petition
brought by a Japanese general who was detained and sentenced to
death by a military commission during World War II. The detention
and trial occurred in the Philippines, still American territory at the
time of the detention.
In 1950, the Supreme Court faced a broadly similar question about
the scope of habeas jurisdiction in Johnson v. Eisentrager.167 Like
Quirin, Eisentrager involved German belligerents. But this time, the
defendants were detained, prosecuted, and convicted not on the
eastern seaboard nor in a U.S. colonial outpost but in China, by
American forces.1 68  The Court in Eisentrager acknowledged, as
162. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); see also Louis Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs on
Trial: A Military Tribunal and American Law (2003); David J. Danelski, The
Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. Supreme Ct. Hist. 61 (1996); Fisher, supra note 7.
163. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20.
164. Id. at 1. The Supreme Court issued a terse per curiam decision, followed by a
fuller decision after several of the saboteurs had been executed. See Fisher, supra note
7, at 27-34 (supplying the details).
165. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
166. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
167. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
168. Id. at 765-66.
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Quirin and Yamashita had earlier held, that enemy aliens do not
necessarily lose the right to avail themselves of a U.S. court. 69 In
Yamashita, the Court stated that Congress "has not withdrawn, and
the Executive branch of the Government could not, unless there was
suspension of the writ, withdraw from the courts the duty and power
to make such inquiry into the authority of the commission as may be
made by habeas corpus."' 70  Eisentrager nonetheless held that the
prisoners had no right to the writ of habeas corpus.171
The Eisentrager Court distinguished Quirin (and Yamashita), both
of which had entertained habeas petitions on the merits, on territorial
grounds. As the Court noted, the petitioners in those cases were
plainly captured, imprisoned, and tried within U.S. territory. In
Eisentrager, by contrast, the petitioners never set foot in the United
States: they were captured, tried, and convicted abroad. Previous
judgments had emphasized that when the judiciary extends
constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, "it was the alien's
presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary
power to act." '172 Presence on U.S. soil "implied protection."'73 Since
no such protective relationship existed for the defendants in
Eisentrager, no correlative duty existed either. Not guests in our
collective home, even impliedly so, the Court held that the defendants
lacked any constitutional protections. The decision in Eisentrager
thus firmly and unequivocably rested on Westphalian territoriality.
Eisentrager served as the basis of the Bush Administration's
position in Rasul and continues to guide the Administration's
litigation stance today.'74 The Bush Administration has consistently
argued that Eisentrager stands for the proposition that, as far as aliens
are concerned, habeas jurisdiction only lies where the United States is
sovereign. Hence, because the Guantanamo lease declares Cuba
sovereign the detainees cannot bring a habeas petition in U.S. courts
while they remain detained in Guantanamo. 7' The D.C. Circuit
agreed with this claim, stating in Al Odah that it could not see how the
"the writ [of habeas corpus] may be made available to aliens abroad
169. See id. at 776.
170. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9.
171. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 781. Nonetheless, the Court did examine the claims of
the petitioners in detail. Hence the petitioners in Al Odah argued that "Johnson,
therefore, is best understood as a restraint on the exercise of habeas, rather than a
limitation on the power of the federal courts." Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 9,
Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (No. 03-334).
172. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 771.
173. Id. at 777-78.
174. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 10, Rasul (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
175. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Gherebi v.
Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2003).
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when basic constitutional protections [were] not."'76  Similar views
were recently expressed in Khalid v. Bush.'77
Rasul, while important, has not altered the Administration's
position. In Rasul, the Supreme Court sidestepped any constitutional
questions, holding instead that the federal habeas statute provided
access to the writ. 7 ' This year, sharply conflicting decisions on what
habeas actually entailed came out of the D.C. district court. Khalid
held that Rasul simply established jurisdiction, and that, because of
their geographic location, the petitioners lack any substantive rights
that run to the merits of their claims.'79 Yet a mere ten days later, a
different judge of the D.C. district court stated that "there [is] nothing
impracticable [or] anomalous in recognizing that the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay have the fundamental right to due process of law
under the Fifth Amendment."'8 s  These two decisions present
radically different, even diametrically opposed, views of legal
spatiality.
Of course, whether Guantanamo is unambiguously foreign territory
is itself unclear. In Rasul, the Supreme Court implied it was not, or at
least was somehow distinctive. At the same time, the majority's
holding did not rest on any special qualities attributed to
Guantanamo-as Justice Scalia's heated dissent points out. Lower
courts have been divided on this question. The Ninth Circuit, in
United States v. Gherebi, had earlier argued that Guantanamo was
U.S. territory for the purposes of habeas jurisdiction and, in the
alternative, that the base was U.S. sovereign territory as well.' By
176. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1141; see also People's Mojahedin Org. v. United States
Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("A foreign entity without property or
presence in this country has no constitutional rights, under the due process clause or
otherwise." (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)));
Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ("The non-resident aliens
here plainly cannot appeal to the protection of the Constitution or laws of the United
States." (citation omitted)).
177. Nos. 1:04-1142, 1:04-1166, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 19,
2005).
178. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004).
179. Khalid, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749, at *27-28.
180. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Nos. 02-CV-0299, 02-CV-0828, 02-CV-
1130, 04-CV-1135, 04-CV-1136, 04-CV-1137, 04-CV-1144, 04-CV-1164, 04-CV-1194,
04-CV-1227, 04-CV-1254, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1236, at *60 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2005).
181. Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1288-89, 1294 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth
Circuit interpreted Johnson v. Eisentrager differently than did the D.C. Circuit.
Gherebi argues that the Supreme Court's holding in Eisentrager does not rest on
sovereignty: "[T]he Court nowhere suggested that 'sovereignty,' as opposed to
'territorial jurisdiction,' was a necessary factor.... In short, we do not believe that
Johnson may properly be read to require 'sovereignty' as an essential prerequisite of
habeas jurisdiction." Id. at 1288. The D.C. District Court in In re Guantanamo
Detainee Cases likewise held that "[i]n light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul,
it is clear that Guantanamo Bay must be considered the equivalent of a U.S. territory
in which fundamental constitutional rights apply. Accordingly,... the respondent's
contention that the Guantanamo detainees have no constitutional rights is
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contrast, the D.C. Circuit in Al Odah held that Guantanamo was
unequivocably foreign territory. The confusion in the lower courts
about the status of Guantanamo was no accident.
B. Leases and Litigation
Given a century of control by the United States, it is not surprising
that litigation over the status of Guantanamo has arisen before.
Federal courts have previously been asked to determine whether the
forty-five square mile base is foreign territory for statutory and
constitutional purposes. The Haitian refugee litigation of the 1990s
raised this issue squarely-with mixed results-and a raft of other
cases have likewise considered Guantanamo's legal status. 182 Relying
on language in the lease purporting to retain ultimate sovereignty in
Cuba, the majority of these cases have maintained that the base is
Cuban, not American, soil. 83
Bird v. United States,"8 for example, involved a Navy physician at
the base who allegedly misdiagnosed a civilian's cancer. The patient
sued the United States for medical malpractice under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Since the Claims Act has a spatial limitation built in-it
bars claims arising from a "foreign country" - the issue was whether
Guantanamo was U.S. territory or rather, part of a "foreign country."
The Supreme Court had, in United States v. Spelar, previously defined
"foreign country" as a "territory subject to the sovereignty of another
nation." '185 Referring to the lease, the Court held that Cuba retained
ultimate sovereignty and thus, Guantanamo was a foreign country for
purposes of the statute. In Colon v. United States,186 a federal district
court faced a similar claim arising from a personal injury on
Guantanamo. The court likewise concluded that Cuba retained
sovereignty, making the base a foreign country for purposes of the
Federal Tort Claims Act. And in Cuban American Bar Ass'n v.
Christopher, the Eleventh Circuit had to determine whether aliens
detained in Guantanamo could assert various statutory and
constitutional rights.187 It held that jurisdiction and control were not
rejected .. " In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1236, at *63-
64.
182. See, e.g., Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992);
Harold Hongju Koh, America's Offshore Refugee Camps, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 139
(1995) [hereinafter Koh, Refugee Camps]; Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections on
Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council, 35 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1 (1994) [hereinafter
Koh, Reflections].
183. But see Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699-701 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Gherebi, 352
F.3d at 1278; In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1236, at *1.
184. 923 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1996).
185. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219 (1949).
186. No. 82 Civ. 34, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16071, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1982).
187. Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1995).
2534 [Vol. 73
THE GEOGRAPHY OF JUSTICE
equivalent to sovereignty, and that military bases abroad therefore
remain under the sovereignty of the host state.188
Guantanamo is nonetheless an unusual place.'89 For several
reasons, it strains credulity to argue that Guantanamo is foreign soil,
no different than Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar or Ramstein Air Base in
Germany. For every American military base abroad, there is an
international legal agreement governing the relationship with the host
state, known as a "Status of Forces Agreement." 190 Uniquely, there is
no such agreement with Cuba. Moreover, the circumstances of the
Guantanamo lease's genesis, as well as the precise provisions, are
quite unusual. Most strikingly, the "lease" is effectively permanent,
since Cuba cannot unilaterally terminate it.
C. Sovereignty and Spatiality in Cuba
The U.S. government's claim of exclusive Cuban sovereignty raises
several difficult questions. Can Guantanamo reasonably be
analogized to ordinary military bases and thus treated legally as
foreign territory? Is Cuban sovereignty necessarily exclusive of U.S.
sovereignty? Is the lease valid under international law? Even if, as a
formal matter, the base is clearly Cuban territory, what bearing ought
this have on the constitutional rights of individuals detained there by
the U.S. government? Below I sketch the history of Guantanamo. In
light of that history, I offer three arguments about the lease, the most
compelling of which interprets the lease language to accord Cuba a
form of reversionary sovereignty and accords the United States
sovereignty for the duration of the lease. I then turn to the larger
question of whether sovereign control is a necessary or appropriate
touchstone for the application of legal rights.
1. American Empire
The genesis of the U.S. base in Guantanamo lies in the American
victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898.19 While the United
States had long asserted a strong measure of control over Latin
America--as evidenced by the Monroe Doctrine--the acquisition of
Spain's colonies marked the emergence of the United States as an
imperial power. Americans had mixed reactions to this imperial
episode. A blue water empire was considered by many to be the
birthright of a great power. Others thought imperialism inconsistent
188. Id. at 1425.
189. "The legal status of Guantanamo Bay, both in international law and in
municipal law, is peculiar and unique." Joseph Lazar, International Legal Status of
Guantanamo Bay, 62 Am. J. Int'l L. 730, 730 (1968).
190. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
191. See generally Jules Robert Benjamin, The United States and Cuba:
Hegemony and Development, 1880-1934 (1977); Lazar, supra note 189.
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with republican government, and sought to grant independence to the
former Spanish colonies as soon as practicable. 92 In some cases, such
as Puerto Rico, independence was never granted; the United States
continues to rule these territories as colonies.193 In others, such as
Cuba, independence arrived after a short period of American rule.
The United States nonetheless maintained a powerful presence in
Cuba right up to the Cuban Revolution.
The Guantanamo lease grew directly out of U.S. sovereignty over
Cuba.'94 U.S. occupation and military government ended in 1902
when Cuba was granted nominal independence.'95 Independence was
conditioned, however, on a formal role for the United States in the
future of Cuba.1 96 This role was manifested in several ways. For one,
the new Cuban constitution included the notorious Platt Amendment,
which permitted the United States to intervene in Cuba at any time
for "the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a
government adequate for the protection of life, property, and
individual liberty."' 97 The lease for Guantanamo was linked to the
Platt Amendment and reflected the relationship -one of highly
compromised Cuban sovereignty-that the Platt Amendment
reflected and sustained. 198 Two, the United States expressly retained
control of the strategic harbor at Guantanamo Bay after ceasing to
occupy the remainder of Cuba. The terms of the Guantanamo lease
were originally drafted as an act of Congress in 1901, while the United
States still controlled Cuba. Language concerning the lease was then
incorporated into the draft constitution. 199 The agreement was signed
by the new President of independent Cuba and President Theodore
Roosevelt in early 1903. Independent Cuba consequently never has
controlled Guantanamo; it has remained in U.S. hands continuously
since Cuba's capture in the Spanish-American War of 1898. In short,
Guantanamo Bay became an American possession (along with the
rest of Cuba) as a spoil of war, and was then immediately leased to the
United States upon the granting of Cuban independence. The lease,
192. Robert L. Beisner, Twelve-Against Empire (1968).
193. See Foreign in a Domestic Sense, supra note 26.
194. Lazar, supra note 189, at 739 ("The United States' rights of occupancy, at the
level of international law, became established prior to the birth of the state of
Cuba.").
195. Robert L. Montague, III, A Brief Study of Some of the International Legal and
Political Aspects of the Guantanamo Bay Problem, 50 Ky. L.J. 459 (1962).
196. See 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 536, 537 (1929).
197. Act of Mar. 2, 1901, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 895, 897 (quoting the Platt Amendment).
198. Lazar, supra note 189, at 734 ("Thus, the agreement for the lease, by its own
terms as well as by admission of the Cuban executive, was anchored in the legal
relationships evidenced by the Platt Amendment incorporated in the Cuban
fundamental law.").
199. 1 The History of Guantanamo Bay ch. 3 (M. E. Murphy ed., 1953), available at
http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/gazette/History-98-64/hischp3.htm.
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with its clause providing for termination only by the will of both
parties, was renewed as part of a treaty with Cuba in 1934.200
While the Platt Amendment was ultimately stripped out of the
Cuban Constitution, the United States continues to occupy the base
and to issue an annual rent check for it. The Castro government,
which forcibly took power in 1959 and considers the base a fraudulent
and illegitimate vestige of Cuba's former colonial status, does not cash
these checks.2 °1 In 1960, Fidel Castro called Guantanamo "a base
thrust upon us by force, in a territory that is unmistakably ours...
imposed by force and a constant threat and a constant cause for
concern." 2 2 In the early 1960s, Cuban hostility was such that there
was significant attention to the idea that Cuba might invade
Guantanamo. °3 Invasion never occurred, though Cuba did shut off all
water supplies to the base, which now employs its own water source.
And the border between the base and Cuba (or, if the U.S. position is
correct, between Cuba and Cuba) is lined with landmines.204 Despite
the evident hostility between Washington and Havana, the United
States continues to adhere to the letter of the accord, claiming that
since the United States does not seek termination of the agreement,
Cuba cannot unilaterally repatriate Guantanamo. Today, the forty-
five square mile naval base, at which about 2500 Americans serve, is a
fully self-sufficient simulacrum of an American town, with a movie
theater, several fast food outlets, and a souvenir shop.20 5
As this history reflects, the nature of U.S. jurisdiction in
Guantanamo is different than that in Johnson v. Eisentrager. In
Eisentrager, as one of the Rasul petitioners argued, "[tihe Executive
could not convene a military commission to try the Johnson
petitioners unless it first secured permission from the Chinese
Government. The same is true for Landsberg prison [in Allied-
occupied Germany], where the Johnson petitioners were detained. 2 6
In Guantanamo, by contrast, Cuba exercises no effective control over
the United States or its use of the naval base, and the United States is
in no way constrained as it pursues, as it now has begun to, trials of
some detainees by military commission.2 7
200. Treaty Between the United States of American and Cuba Defining Their
Relations, May 9, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, art. 111, 48 Stat. 1682, 1683.
201. The annual rent is $4085. See Toobin, supra note 14, at 37.
202. Montague, supra note 195, at 472 (quoting Fidel Castro, Address at the United
Nations General Assembly (Sept. 26, 1960)).
203. See id.
204. Toobin, supra note 14, at 37.
205. Rose, supra note 6, at 91. These establishments may violate the Guantanamo
lease itself, which provides that no commercial or industrial enterprises can be
established on the base.
206. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 45, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004)
(No. 03-334) (citation omitted).
207. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity
of Military Commissions, 5 Green Bag 2d 249 (2002); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H.
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The United States has made use of Guantanamo as a detention
facility in the past. In the 1980s and 1990s, the United States housed
Haitian refugees there."0 8 After the attacks of September 11, 2001, and
the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the Pentagon sought to use the
base as a holding pen for alleged al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. The
first detention facility, dubbed "Camp X-Ray," gave way to a second,
more permanent structure, known as "Camp Delta."209  The
approximately 500 Guantanamo detainees are, by several accounts,
largely low-level figures. The most significant suspects are reportedly
held in interrogation centers established elsewhere around the globe:
at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, by the Thai government in
Thailand, and in some cases, on United States naval ships at sea.
2 10
Indeed, some American officials question the wisdom of the
Guantanamo detentions, which have incurred markedly negative
responses both here and abroad. Whether wise or not, however, the
detention of foreigners there raises many intriguing questions about
legal spatiality in American law as well as the peculiar status of
Guantanamo. One such question is the validity of the lease itself.
2. Validity
The Guantanamo lease is not a reciprocal agreement between
sovereigns. It is a direct legacy of a colonial relationship.212
Guantanamo Bay fell into U.S. hands as a spoil of war. Then, as a
condition of Cuban independence, the United States leased the base
in perpetuity. 3 Previous cases regarding Guantanamo have relied
Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 Yale L.J. 1259
(2002); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23
Mich. J. Int'l L. 1 (2001); Aryeh Neier, The Military Tribunals on Trial, N.Y. Rev.
Books, Feb. 14, 2002, at 11.
208. See Koh, Refugee Camps, supra note 182; Koh, Reflections, supra note 182.
209. Still further buildings are under construction. See Charles Savage, Camp
Expansion Indication of U.S. Stance on Military's Detainees, Miami Herald, Aug. 26,
2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service File;
Toobin, supra note 14, at 41.
210. Risen & Shanker, supra note 152 (describing network of prisons run by the
Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency in Afghanistan, Thailand, and other
undisclosed locations); Rose, supra note 6, at 133.
211. Rose, supra note 6, at 136.
212. Lazar, supra note 189, at 739.
213. There are, of course, other such leases-most prominently, the now-historical
lease between China and Great Britain extending control to the United Kingdom
over the Hong Kong territory. That lease expired in 1997 and was not renewed. The
Hong Kong lease is terse and simply states that "Great Britain shall have sole
jurisdiction" in the new area and makes no express mention of sovereignty.
Convention Between China and Great Britain Respecting an Extension of Hong
Kong Territory, June 9, 1898, P.R.C.-Gr. Brit., 186 Consol. T.S. 310. The U.K.
Foreign Office nonetheless treated the lease as granting the United Kingdom
sovereignty for ninety-nine years. This fact is derived from an e-mail correspondence
between the author and Anthony Aust, former Deputy Legal Advisor in the United
Kingdom's Foreign Office.
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heavily on the literal text of the lease and its language concerning
sovereignty. But given its history and structure, the lease's continuing
validity is not above question. International legal doctrine presents at
least two arguments that the lease may no longer be valid. While both
are tenable, neither is especially strong.
The first argument turns on the origins of the lease. Does the
lease's genesis in a colonial relationship somehow vitiate its legality?
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codifies the
customary international law of treaties, holds that if a new peremptory
norm of international law emerges, any existing treaty in conflict with
that norm is void.2 14 Peremptory or jus cogens norms are legal norms
that are so significant that they cannot be altered or contradicted by
international agreement. If the lease violates such a norm, it is no
longer valid under international law. The problem with this argument
is that the content of the category of peremptory norms is highly
disputed. Aside from a few very well-established norms, such as
genocide, there is little agreement among states or jurists on what falls
within the bounds of jus cogens. Consequently, it is hard to see
precisely what norm the Guantanamo lease violates that reasonably
has the status of jus cogens.215  The lease is undoubtedly in deep
tension with certain structural principles of the international order-
sovereign equality, disfavor for colonialism, and nonintervention in
the domestic affairs of sovereign states, among others. Yet these are
not generally thought to be jus cogens norms, and so this argument is
unpersuasive.
A second possible doctrinal argument rests on the concept of rebus
sic stantibus. Under the customary international law of treaties, as
well as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an agreement
may be terminated if a fundamental change of circumstances occurs
which (1) was an essential basis of the consent of the parties to the
treaty and (2) radically transforms the extent of the obligations to be
performed.2 16 A change in government is not sufficient in and of itself
to terminate a treaty under this doctrine. But the shift in Cuba after
Castro took power is not mere change of government; rather, Cuba
became a state with an ideology and political system completely
oppositional to that of the United States. This hostility is manifested
in the landmines that ring the base. With such outward hostility, the
continued existence of a foreign military base is unusual indeed. Like
the jus cogens argument, however, this argument ultimately lacks
214. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
art. 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 347.
215. Restatement, supra note 47, § 102 n.6 ("Although the concept of jus cogens is
now accepted, its content is not agreed."); see also Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law 514-17 (5th ed. 1998).
216. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 214, art. 62, 1155




force. Whether the dramatic shift in Cuban-American relations after
the revolution is sufficient to meet the test of the Vienna Convention
for treaty termination is unclear. Previous cases have set quite a high
bar for invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. In a recent
International Court of Justice case involving a treaty between two
former Warsaw Pact states (relating to the construction of a dam), the
momentous fall of communism in Eastern Europe was held
insufficient to justify the invocation of rebus sic stantibus.2 17 While the
change at stake in the Guantanamo case is clearly quite significant, it
by no means is plainly sufficient to meet the doctrinal standard. Even
if it were, moreover, the political significance of such a ruling is highly
uncertain.
3. Interpretation
A more compelling argument does not involve any challenge to the
lease's validity per se but rather the interpretation of it. The critical
language of the lease states that Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty,"
whereas the United States exercises "complete jurisdiction and
control. 2 18 Most federal courts have interpreted this language to
mean that Cuba is the sole sovereign in Guantanamo and have held
that sovereignty was the touchstone under prior precedents such as
Eisentrager.219 The Bush Administration argued that jurisdiction is
distinct from sovereignty-an accurate statement-but that
sovereignty is the key to habeas jurisdiction. It was this latter claim
that the Supreme Court rejected as a statutory matter in Rasul.220
Since the Guantanamo lease specifies that Cuba retains "ultimate
sovereignty," the U.S. position was and remains that this fact disposes
of any constitutional claims of the detainees.22'
Yet traditional canons of construction suggest a different reading of
the lease, one more faithful to the history of the base and to the
realities of the American presence in Guantanamo. This reading
turns on the meaning of the phrase "ultimate sovereignty." Under the
Bush Administration's interpretation, the word "ultimate" in the lease
217. Gab ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25),
available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ihs/ihsjudgement/ihs-ijudgment-970925_frame.htm.
218. See Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, supra note 1, art. III, 6
Bevans at 1113, 1114.
219. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1142-43 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Eisentrager, in fact, is inconsistent on this point, referring at times to territorial
jurisdiction and at times to sovereignty. The Ninth Circuit seized on this in its
decision in Gherebi. Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003).
220. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2693, 2696-98 (2004).
221. See also Gherebi, 352 F.3d at 1286 ("In other words, in the government's view,
whatever the Lease and continuing Treaty say about the United States' complete
territorial jurisdiction, Guantanamo falls outside U.S. sovereign territory-a
distinction it asserts is controlling under Johnson.").
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is surplusage. The lease could simply read "Cuba remains sovereign"
with no change in the legal outcome. "Ultimate sovereignty" can
alternatively, and more reasonably, be interpreted to refer to
reversion. Cuba retains a reversionary right over Guantanamo if and
when the lease is terminated by mutual assent of the parties.2 In this
reading, Cuba is the reversionary sovereign and the United States the
temporary sovereign. The United States cannot cede Guantanamo to
any state other than Cuba, and if the United States exits Guantanamo,
the base reverts completely to Cuba.
In this alternative reading, the word "ultimate" actually performs
interpretive work. It refers to residual sovereignty, a concept well
known in international law. 223 This reversionary reading is consistent
with both the plain meaning of the text and with the realities of the
subsequent behavior of the parties-two central considerations when
interpreting the texts of international agreements .2 24  This
interpretation is strengthened further by consideration of the
language of "complete control and jurisdiction," rather than merely
"control and jurisdiction." Why did the drafters add the term
"complete"? The use of the modifier "complete" suggests that the
United States is exercising a special sort of control and jurisdiction, a
view consistent with the preceding interpretation that the United
States is a temporary sovereign for the duration of the lease. This
theory suggests that Guantanamo is broadly analogous to U.S. insular
possessions such as Guam. An even closer parallel is the former
Canal Zone in Panama. The Canal Zone was carved out of
Panamanian territory via a treaty with the United States, also dating
222. In Gherebi, the Ninth Circuit argued similarly, concluding that the 1903 lease's
use of "ultimate sovereignty" means that
during the unlimited and potentially permanent period of U.S. possession
and control over Guantanamo, the United States possesses and exercises all
of the attributes of sovereignty, while Cuba retains only a residual or
reversionary sovereignty interest, contingent on a possible future United
States' decision to surrender its complete jurisdiction and control.
Gherebi, 352 F.3d at 1291.
223. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 215, at 110-11.
224. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies the customary law of
treaty interpretation. The Convention declares that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 214, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. Context is to be
derived from further agreements between the parties and "subsequent practice" of
the parties. Id. The object and purpose, particularly when read in light of the
contemporaneous Platt Amendment to the Cuban Constitution, is relatively clear: to
ensure that the United States maintained control over Guantanamo as a coaling
station and to keep U.S. forces within Cuba as a means of asserting hegemony. The
subsequent practice of the United States includes extensive use of Guantanamo for a
host of commercial activities and the creation of a self-sustaining city there. Cuba has
renounced the agreement and cut off the water and other supplies in retaliation for
what, in Cuban eyes, is the manifest unfairness of the lease. See Neuman, Anomalous
Zones, supra note 13 (discussing these facts).
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from 1903.21 That treaty grants to the United States "all the rights,
power and authority.., which the United States would possess and
exercise if it were the sovereign.
26
This reading is bolstered by consideration of the factual
circumstances of the base. Since negotiating the extraordinary lease
terms with the newly independent but thoroughly subservient Cuban
government, the United States has never relinquished its occupation
of Guantanamo . 27 Guantanamo was in U.S. hands after the Spanish-
American War, and the base remains in American hands today.
228
This unusual history accords well with a revised interpretation of the
phrase "ultimate sovereignty." And it accords well with the realities
of U.S. power in Guantanamo, which is, in practical terms, total.
Cuba, whatever the lease may say as a formal matter, is a wholly
ineffective "lessor" and poses no threat to the U.S. base whatsoever.
Cuban law is uncontestedly unavailable to the detainees, and Cuban
courts play no part in this-or any previous-litigation. U.S.
jurisdiction over both American civilians and foreign nationals
present in Guantanamo is total.229 In sum, for all intents and
purposes, the reality is that Guantanamo is as American a territory as
Puerto Rico.33
225. Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Nov. 18, 1903, U.S.-Pan., 33 Stat. 2234.
226. Id. at 2235. A later treaty reduced these rights and powers. See Green, supra
note 26, at 789-93.
227. Indeed, it would not be surprising if the United States negotiated favorable
military base lease terms with the newly independent but quite subservient Iraqi
government. Even then, however, a lease in perpetuity is highly unlikely-a sign both
of how views about intervention have changed and how extraordinary the
Guantanamo lease is.
228. This view is not wholly novel. For example, Joseph Lazar has stated the
following:
The international legal record thus speaks for itself as to the occupation
rights of the United States over the territory of the Guantanamo Naval
Station. This record also clarifies the meaning of "ultimate sovereignty."...
Thus, when [the lease] provided that "the United States recognizes the
continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the
described areas of land and water," it presumably was understood that the
cession in lease over the territory either recognized the sovereignty over the
territory to be in the United States for the duration of the period of
occupation, or simply recognized the suspension of sovereignty pending the
vesting of ultimate sovereignty on conclusion of the period of occupation.
Joseph Lazar, "Cession in Lease" of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station and Cuba's
"Ultimate Sovereignty," 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 116, 117-18 (1969).
229. See United States v. Lee, 906 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1990) (appeal from dismissal
of indictment of Jamaican national charged with sexual abuse on Guantanamo);
United States v. Rogers, 388 F. Supp. 298, 301 (E.D. Va. 1975) (prosecution of a
United States civilian employed in Guantanamo for drug offense committed on the
base site).
230. Cf supra Part II.D (discussing the Insular Cases).
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4. The Atom of Sovereignty
Whether one agrees or disagrees with this reading of the lease is
perhaps not dispositive of the question of whether the Constitution
somehow applies to aliens in Guantanamo. The question of who-the
United States or Cuba-has sovereignty over Guantanamo
presupposes that sovereignty is indivisible and cannot be concurrently
held. If it is Cuba that is sovereign, the Bush Administration asserts,
then the United States ipso facto is not sovereign. Yet this is not at all
clear as a conceptual matter. Indeed, "the American experience
belies the notion that the atom of sovereignty cannot be split.
2 31
The crux of the lower court decisions in Al Odah and Khalid was
the contention that the naval base is "outside the sovereignty of the
United States." '232 Implicit in this is the idea that sovereignty is
absolute, bounded, and exclusive. These notions are all derived from
the Westphalian ideal of sovereignty, which, as discussed above,
became entrenched in American jurisprudence and law in the
nineteenth century. In practice, as I have shown, that ideal only
loosely accords with contemporary reality.233 Sovereignty has never
been fully aligned with the Westphalian territorial ideal.234 More
pertinently, the thrust of the doctrinal evolution described in Part II
illustrates that legal spatiality has, in a number of key areas of the law,
been increasingly decoupled from sovereignty. The result is that
today, U.S. law, both statutory and constitutional, is routinely held to
apply beyond the sovereign borders of the United States.235
More significantly, sovereignty need not, and has frequently not
been, conceptualized as mutually exclusive-as the history of the
United States and other federal states make clear. Federalism is a
system of shared sovereignty in which territory is divided for some
purposes but not for others. American federalism is one of dual, or
triple sovereignties: Federal, state, and tribal sovereignty all coexist in
a complex system, though the last is more vestigial than vital.236 As
the Supreme Court declared in Alden v. Maine, the Constitution
"preserves the sovereign status of the States" and "reserves to them a
substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with
231. United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1180 (9th Cir. 2000). The "split atom"
trope is drawn from U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). In his
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that "[tihe Framers split the atom of
sovereignty." Id. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
232. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
233. See supra Part II.
234. Krasner, supra note 31, at 24-25; Philpott, supra note 32; see also Michael Ross
Fowler & Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State 49 (1995) (stating
that sovereignty "is a matter of degree, not of bright lines").
235. See supra Part II.
236. The states retain "the dignity and essential attributes inhering" in sovereignty.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty
and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425 (1987).
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the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status. 23 7 The
states thus retain, in the words of James Madison, "a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty," a sovereignty that coexists with that possessed
by the federal government. 238 Thus our own federal structure is one of
"dueling sovereignties, ' '239 in which the states and the federal
government (and occasionally the tribes) battle over power and
control. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in United States v. Corey,
two sovereignties may, as in our federal system, exercise concurrent
jurisdiction, and this "principle applies no less in the international
domain. "241
Sovereignty is hence not an all-or-nothing proposition.
Consequently, there is no necessary conceptual, constitutional, or
practical reason to believe that whatever sovereignty Cuba enjoys in
Guantanamo necessarily strips the United States of sovereignty. 41 In
other words, one need not accept the lease-based idea that Cuba
retains only a reversionary sovereignty in Guantanamo to conclude
that the United States is partially sovereign in Guantanamo. Both
states may be sovereign concurrently, with the particular sovereignty
of each dependent on the precise issue at hand. This view tracks our
own theories of sovereignty as embodied in federalism, while also
yielding a result-constitutional application to Guantanamo-that fits
with the best tradition of American constitutionalism.
237. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714.
238. The Federalist No. 39, at 198 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
239. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 78 (1995).
240. United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1180 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision in
Corey goes on to note that this is true for lease agreements with foreign sovereigns as
well, with the terms of the lease governing the concurrent authority.
241. The Bush Administration argued in its brief opposing certiorari in Al Odah
that the determination of sovereignty is in essence a political question. Brief for the
Respondents at 23, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343) (citing
Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380 (1948)). Vermilya-Brown
addressed a U.S. base in Bermuda and also involved the interpretation of that lease's
language. As a matter of simple precedent, the Administration's position is arguably
on firm footing. But Guantanamo's anomalies render that simplicity problematic. Is
it really the case that the courts must turn a blind eye to the realities of permanent
American control? The Ninth Circuit, in Gherebi, rejected that view, As the Ninth
Circuit argued:
If "sovereignty" is "the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by
which any independent state is governed," "the power to do everything in a
state without accountability," or "freedom from external control: autonomy,
independence," it would appear that there is no stronger example of the
United States' exercise of "supreme power," or the adverse nature of its
occupying power, than this country's purposeful actions contrary to the
terms of the lease and over the vigorous objections of a powerless "lessor."
Any honest assessment of the nature of the United States' authority and
control in Guantanamo today allows only one conclusion: the U.S. exercises
all of "the basic attribute[s] of full territorial sovereignty."
Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1296 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
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Finally, even if concurrent or reversionary notions of sovereignty
are rejected, sovereignty and jurisdiction are distinct concepts and one
need not entail the other-as Rasul made plain, and as a host of
extraterritoriality cases over the last sixty years demonstrate. As the
historical practice of habeas corpus shows, courts may have
jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions even if the petitioners are held
outside the sovereign territory of the government.242  Clearly,
American citizens can bring habeas petitions if detained in
Guantanamo. Sovereign control of the territory upon which they sit is
not necessary for the federal courts to have jurisdiction. Why then
should sovereign control be necessary-as the Bush Administration
argues-for jurisdiction over noncitizens? In Rasul, and in the current
post-Rasul litigation, the United States rested its claim of the necessity
of sovereign power upon Eisentrager. Yet Eisentrager did not
expressly hold that all noncitizen detainees held outside the territory
of the United States cannot bring petitions of habeas corpus. Rather,
it more narrowly held that enemy aliens, tried and convicted abroad
by military tribunal, cannot review their convictions in U.S. civil
courts.243
In sum, I have critiqued the prevailing interpretation of the
Guantanamo lease agreement for failing to read meaning into all the
key terms in the text, and have argued that a better reading is that
Cuba is the reversionary sovereign in Guantanamo, whereas the
United States is de jure sovereign-as it unequivocably is sovereign in
a de facto sense. Moreover, I have argued, our own federal structure
demonstrates that there is no necessary barrier to American
sovereignty in Guantanamo coexisting with Cuban sovereignty, with
each sovereign authoritatively controlling a delimited sets of powers
and issues. Even if, in other words, one rejects the concept of
reversionary Cuban sovereignty, it does not follow that the U.S.
wields no sovereign powers at the base. Thus between the two
diametrically-opposed positions taken in the D.C. district court
decisions of January 2005-by Judge Green and by Judge Leon- my
argument unequivocably supports Judge Green's statement that
"Guantanamo Bay must be considered the equivalent of a U.S.
territory in which fundamental constitutional rights apply." 2"
Guantanamo, and the terms of the lease granting the United States
control over it, are vestigial remnants of the age of empire.
Throwbacks to an earlier and quite different time, they are difficult to
242. Brief Amici Curiae of Legal Historians Listed Herein in Support of the
Petitioners at 19, Rasul, (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
243. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Nos. 02-CV-0299, 02-CV-0828, 02-CV-
1130, 04-CV-1135, 04-CV-1136, 04-CV-1137, 04-CV-1144, 04-CV-1164, 04-CV-1194,
04-CV-1227, 04-CV-1254, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1236, at *63 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2005).
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defend on any principled basis.245 The only reason the forty-five
square miles of Guantanamo remain in U.S. hands is America's "full
spectrum dominance" over Cuba. 46 Distinguishing Guantanamo
from other American military bases is not difficult. A more profound
critique of the legal treatment of Guantanamo focuses on the concept
of legal spatiality itself, however. Why does moving individuals from
one geographic location to another fundamentally alter the scope of
their constitutional and statutory rights vis-A-vis the U.S. government?
What is the legal magic of American soil?
In this regard, it is instructive to compare the decision in Al Odah to
that of the Supreme Court in In re Ross 247 more than a century ago.
Ross involved an enclave of overseas American power-the consular
court system in Japan-that, like Guantanamo, grew out of the
fundamental inequalities of the time. Like the Guantanamo base, it
too was sanctioned by treaty. Ross held that the Constitution could
not apply to U.S. government actions within the territory of another
sovereign because sovereignty was exclusive; hence the defendant
possessed no constitutional rights that could be violated by the U.S.
government.2 48 The logic of Al Odah is strikingly similar. Because
Cuba is sovereign, the United States is not sovereign and therefore
the detainees lack any constitutional rights against the U.S.
government. Just as the consular courts of the imperial era were
untrammeled by either U.S. constitutional or local municipal law, so is
Guantanamo unaffected and indeed unreachable-as far as foreigners
are concerned-by our fundamental law and by Cuban law. A more
pure-and anachronistic-statement of legal spatiality can hardly be
imagined.
IV. RETHINKING LEGAL SPATIALITY
Does territoriality-the idea that geographic location determines
legal rules-make sense in an increasingly globalized world? Can the
United States, a nation committed to constitutional government-a
"government of laws, and not of men"-in fact govern unfettered by
its basic law as long as it acts outside certain spaces? 49 These
questions, one consequentialist, the other deontological, were for
decades arcane. But they are now once again at the forefront of
American law and politics.5 Suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban
245. This is not to deny that all these practices seem to be enjoying a resurgence.
246. This phrase is from the U.S. Department of Defense's Joint Vision 2020. See
U.S. Dep't of Def., Joint Vision 2020, available at
http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jv2020.doc (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
247. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
248. Id. at 464.
249. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
250. These questions also were hotly debated during the era of the Insular Cases.
"It is difficult to realize how fervent a controversy raged... over the question of
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detainees were deliberately housed at Guantanamo for reasons of
security, but also to ensure that judicial processes did not interfere
with the detention and interrogation of the prisoners. One of
Britain's top Law Lords called Guantanamo "a legal black hole. 251
Can the Constitution accommodate such black holes?
Perhaps an easier way to begin the analysis is to try to defend, from
a principled stance, the reverse proposition. What reason is there to
believe that U.S. law is spatially bound? The strongest argument in
favor of a territorial conception of legal spatiality starts from
Westphalian principles. The modern state is built on a territorial
framework of political rule. This framework ensures order in an
anarchic world system.2 2 Under traditional Westphalian principles,
the extension of any law into another sovereign's physical domain
inherently subverts territorial sovereignty. This strict spatial
conception of sovereignty was, as this Article has demonstrated,
deeply favored in the nineteenth century.253 It continues to be a
central part of international law, prominently reflected, for example,
in the United Nations Charter of 1945.
But it is decreasingly relevant today. The erosion of legal spatiality
in a host of doctrinal areas, and the embrace of extraterritorial claims
by many other states, represents a marked, if uneven and incomplete,
break with the past. The Supreme Court has rejected pure spatiality
in a wide variety of cases-Bowman, Hartford Fire, Reid, Asahi, and
Rasul, to name just some-and has done so in often emphatic terms.5
While the sources of this evolution in conceptions of legal spatiality
are murky, it appears that underlying changes in economics, politics,
and society have nudged Congress, the Executive, and the courts
toward a more functional and pragmatic approach to jurisdiction.255
Hence, it is now uncontested that were American citizens held in
Guantanamo, the federal courts would have habeas jurisdiction over
them.256 And, under long-standing precedent, so too would American
detainees held there possess fundamental constitutional rights.
whether the Constitution follows the flag.... The election of 1900 largely turned
upon the so-called issue of imperialism." Coudert, supra note 138, at 823.
251. Steyn, supra note 5.
252. Herz, supra note 33, at 481.
253. Indeed, the existence of a liberal peace and the general move toward
democracy around the world arguably render the normative arguments in favor of
strict territoriality less profound today. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies,
and Foreign Affairs (pts. 1 & 2), 12 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 205, 323 (1983); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 Eur. J. Int'l L. 503 (1995).
But see Jos6 E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's
Liberal Theory, 12 Eur. J. Int'l L. 183 (2001).
254. See supra Part II.
255. Raustiala, supra note 62.
256. Even the government conceded this in the oral argument in Padilla v.
Rumsfeld. See Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 16, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686
(2004) (No. 03-334) (citation omitted).
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Though it perhaps had the virtue of conceptual coherence, there is
little reason to expect or to prefer a return to nineteenth-century strict
territoriality.2 57 The evolution of American law has been a process in
which formalistic categories based on spatial location and geographic
borders were rejected in favor of more supple, contextual concepts
such as "effects" and "minimum contacts., 218  Just as fundamental
changes in the American economy led to the demise of the approach
of Pennoyer v. Neff25 9 the evolution and increasing interdependence
of the international system-in both economic and security terms-
has encouraged courts, legislatures, and executives around the world
to break the link between law and land. Yet aspects of strict
territoriality remain, persisting even as the underlying conceptual
approach that birthed them has long fallen into desuetude. This
discontinuity places tension on the remaining spatial doctrines,
underscoring inconsistencies that cannot be logically reconciled.
The result has been a tendency to invoke earlier cases, such as
Eisentrager, in an incantatory and conclusory manner, with little
justification offered for the underlying premises of spatiality. In part,
this is because a coherent and consistent approach to legal spatiality
no longer exists. In 1909, Justice Holmes could straightforwardly lay
out a theory of legal spatiality to support his conclusion that the
Sherman Act was territorially limited and could not reach actions that
occurred abroad.216 Today, courts no longer provide such a theory
because they cannot. Rather, courts assess effects and consider
context, often en route to declaring that the U.S. law in question has
global-or at least extraterritorial-reach. If courts instead seek to
257. In the realm of personal jurisdiction, the problems of strict territoriality were
legion, and Beale's vested rights approach did little to solve them. See generally
Kramer, supra note 58; Rutherglen, supra note 78.
258. See supra Part III.
259. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The nationalization of the American economy was central
to this process. See, e.g., Virginia Postrel, Economic Scene: A Case Study in Free
Trade: American Incomes Converge, But Not at the Bottom, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,
2004, at C2 (showing data on the convergence of incomes across regions in the United
States over the past century, with an acceleration in the 1930-1950 period); see also
Berman, supra note 60 (developing the connection between globalization and
jurisdiction).
260. Berman, supra note 60. As Kramer argues, "[t]o understand the decision in
American Banana, it is important also to understand the legal environment in which
Holmes was writing. Territoriality was the cornerstone of a framework developed to
regulate sovereign relations in a number of areas, of which choice of law was merely
one." Kramer, supra note 58, at 187.
261. My discussion here complements that of Neuman. See Neuman, Anomalous
Zones, supra note 13. Neuman provides a set of functional concerns that might lead a
government official or judicial actor to differentiate legal rules based on location. For
example, zoning rules that permitted sex clubs to operate in some parts of a
municipality but barred them from school zones exhibit what he terms spatial
variation. Among the considerations Neuman proffers are objective local conditions,
subjective local preferences, desire for experimentation, and mere political power. Id.
at 1201-06.
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restrain extraterritorial assertions, they often woodenly invoke the
"presumption against extraterritoriality ' '26 2 or, if the situation
addresses individual rights against the government, trot out a handful
of increasingly antiquated cases-the Insular Cases, Eisentrager,
Duncan v. Kahanamoku263 -and declare the question closed.
21
The progressive abandonment over the course of the last century of
strict territoriality starkly raises the question of what role ought
spatiality play in American law. This question is not easily answered.
But my claim here is that simple spatial assumptions are unconvincing,
out-of-date, and out of step with our constitutional principles. The
clear trend in American law and in international law 26 5-and the more
compelling reading of the Constitution-suggests that a despatialized
approach ought to be the default position, subject to exceptions based
on functional and practical concerns.
The implications of this proposition are not academic. American
regulators have plainly extended their jurisdiction beyond our
borders. And over the last decades, American criminal justice
officials have increasingly worked overseas. During the 1970s and
1980s, for example, as global drug markets grew and trafficking
proliferated, the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") pursued
traffickers not only in Miami and San Diego but also across the border
262. In some areas, the presumption is rebutted much more easily than in others.
On occasion the courts treat it seriously. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244 (1991). According to Jonathan Turley,
in the interpretation of ambiguous antitrust and securities laws, the
presumption [against extraterritoriality] has proven little impediment to
extraterritorial application. This is not, however, true in other areas. Unlike
extraterritorial antitrust and securities cases, extraterritorial employment
discrimination and environmental claims have been roundly rejected,
making the presumption an almost complete barrier to victims of
extraterritorial employment or environmental misconduct.
Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 598, 599-600 (1990); see also Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 18, at 526 ("In the 1970s and 1980s, lower courts applied the
effects test aggressively to regulate extraterritorial conduct, spawning controversy
with some of the United States' closest trading partners.").
263. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
264. As Neuman argues:
To find that aliens have extraterritorial constitutional rights would be an
extension of prior law. Reid v. Covert does not require such an extension as
a matter of precedent, because Reid v. Covert involved citizens. But that
does not suffice to explain why the recognition of extraterritorial
constitutional rights in Reid v. Covert does not destroy the persuasive power
of the earlier precedents.
Strangers to the Constitution, supra note 13, at 106.
265. Even the United Nations is increasingly questioning Westphalian sovereignty.
Secretary General Kofi Annan has forcefully argued that sovereign borders no longer
ought to protect states against wrongdoing directed at their own citizens-that
international human rights norms constrain the actions governments may take. Kofi
Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, The Economist, Sept. 18, 1999, at 49, 49-50.
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in Tijuana and Cali. 266 The number of DEA agents stationed abroad
rose dramatically during this period, from about twelve in 1967 to
over 300 by 1991.267 Just as the globalization of economic production
in the postwar era led the Department of Justice to increasingly
pursue cartels abroad-and to cooperate with foreign antitrust
regulators in the process-so too has the globalization of crime led the
FBI, the Customs Service, the DEA, and other federal agencies to
work aggressively abroad, in an effort to stanch the flow of cross-
border narcotics, people, weapons, and money. These extraterritorial
projections of American law enforcement power inevitably raise
questions of the extraterritorial scope of American legal protections.
A. A Global Constitution
The most sweeping approach to rethinking legal spatiality is to
embrace the notion that-as a presumptive matter-our legal system
operates globally: that when the government exercises power, that
exercise is presumed to operate without regard to territorial location
and is always subject to constitutional restrictions. 268 This approach
can be moderated through a practicality standard, in which
extraterritorial location is taken into account, but not treated as
dispositive, in considering the range of legal rules that apply to a given
situation. A different phrasing of this position is that there is no
inherent spatial dimension to the law, though spatial restrictions may,
in particular cases and under particular circumstances, be adduced
that would trump this default position. This is the claim I will lay out
and defend here. The alternative stance is to cling to the notion that
American law is somehow tethered to territory-that simply by
moving an individual around in space, the duties that apply -and most
significantly, the rights that individual enjoys-wax and wane.
The claim that the Constitution is not presumptively spatially
delimited may seem radical but is not fanciful. The framers of the
Constitution plainly envisioned a territory; the Westphalian territorial
state was the template they worked with in creating a new state. Yet
266. Globalization has enhanced the movement of illicit goods just as it has the
movement of licit goods. The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (H. Richard
Friman & Peter Andreas eds., 1999); Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization &
International Narcotics Trafficking, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 89 (1999).
267. Nadelmann, supra note 74, at 3. This is not to imply that there is no precedent
for the extraterritorial extension of American criminal law; as Bowman itself shows,
the issue hit the Supreme Court as early as 1920, and of course long before then
American agents had been concerned with fugitive slaves and smuggling schemes.
The onset of Prohibition dramatically increased the amount of cross-smuggling and
concomitantly increased the extent of extraterritorial American police action. See
generally id.
268. See, e.g., United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1262 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[O]nce
we subject foreign vessels or aliens to criminal prosecution, they are entitled to the
equal protection of all our laws, including the Fourth Amendment.").
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the language, and the underlying concepts, of the constitutional order
they forged are not inherently spatially delimited. The Constitution
creates a government of limited powers and places further restrictions
on the use of those powers. These federal powers are not thought to
be spatially delimited.
For example, there is no spatial limitation to the Commander-in-
Chief power. The President is Commander-in-Chief not just when the
President or American troops are present within the borders of the
United States, but wherever he or the troops may go. Nor does the
Vice President cease wielding the powers of the vice presidency, or a
senator lose legislative powers, when he or she leaves the borders of
the United States. U.S. courts have long held that Congress can
legislate beyond our sovereign borders. As the Supreme Court
declared in 1922 in United States v. Bowman,26 9 some criminal statutes,
and some regulatory statutes, cannot function if held to apply only
within the spatial confines of American territorial jurisdiction-and
consequently we apply them globally. American citizens and
foreigners alike are subject to some American laws wherever they
may go on the planet. In short, our understanding of the spatial scope
of federal powers is read functionally: The Commander-in-Chief
power would be severely hobbled if it only applied within American
borders, and it makes little sense to believe that the Vice
President's-or any other government official's-powers wane as he
or she crosses the border.
This functional approach to constitutional powers seems natural.
Yet there is no a priori reason to believe that the spatial restrictions
the framers placed on the powers of the federal government cannot or
should not be read functionally as well.
What would a despatialized understanding of legal rules and
protections look like? It would not demand that all rules apply
identically in all places. When a constitutional or statutory rule is
clearly and textually subject to a territorial limitation, or reasonably
may be thought to contain such a limitation, a spatial reading of its
scope is likely to be justified. Likewise, if a legal rule would be
nullified in its effect if it did not contain a territorial limitation, or
would violate principles of international law and comity if it lacked
such a limitation, a spatially limited reading of its scope may also be
justified.270 But under this approach to the law-geography nexus, such
a justification must be offered and defended before any spatial
delimitation can be said to exist.
Such a presumptively-despatialized approach to American law can
be glimpsed already in aspects of American legal doctrine. For
269. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).




example, it broadly accords with the contemporary approach to
personal jurisdiction, where the federal courts have held that the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids jurisdiction, even over aliens abroad,
unless there is some act "by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." '271 The inquiry
is guided by the functional and principled concerns that undergird the
purposes of personal jurisdiction, not by simple or mechanical
locational analysis.
My proposed approach, therefore, often will yield spatial
distinctions in both substantive legal rules and in legal protections and
rights. But this differentiation must be justified and reasonable under
the circumstances, rather than simply reflexive. This approach lies
somewhere between what Gerald Neuman has called "global due
process" and "mutuality of obligation." '272 Mutuality of obligation, for
Neuman, "affords the express protections of fundamental law, to the
extent that their terms permit, as a condition for subjecting a person
to the nation's law." '273 Global due process aims in the same direction,
but more cautiously. It is chary of holding that constitutional rights
are presumptively applicable to all persons and seeks to narrow the
range of rights that might apply to noncitizens abroad.274 As Justice
John Marshall Harlan stated in Reid with regard to constitutional
protections:
The proposition is, of course, not that the Constitution "does not
apply" overseas, but that there are provisions in the Constitution
which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign
place....
... [T]he question of which specific safeguards of the
Constitution are appropriately to be applied in a particular context
overseas can be reduced to the issue of what process is "due" a
defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case.275
B. The Current Approach
Despite occasional nods from the judiciary, my proposed approach
to legal spatiality does not reflect current legal doctrine. To be sure,
no comprehensive theory of legal spatiality has been articulated by
the Supreme Court since the late nineteenth century. The federal
271. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see Gary A. Haugen, Personal
Jurisdiction and Due Process Rights for Alien Defendants, 11 B.U. Int'l L.J. 109
(1993); Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and "Purposeful Availment": A
Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev.
455 (2004).
272. Strangers to the Constitution, supra note 13, at 113.
273. Id. at 108.
274. Id. at 109.
275. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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courts tend to avoid considering the question in toto, preferring to
analyze more narrow dimensions (for example, does a given statute
have extraterritorial effect?) or to simply reiterate without analysis
older territorial statements (derived, often, from the Insular Cases).
The result is that questions of statutory application have received a
variegated, even schizophrenic treatment. The Supreme Court has on
occasion tried to justify a territorial approach to constitutional
protections that, as a facial matter, lack express geographic
limitations.27 6 Verdugo is perhaps the most prominent example of
such an implied territorial limitation. In Verdugo, the Supreme Court
faced two facts that could have suggested a despatialized reading of
the Fourth Amendment's protections. The first was the text of the
Fourth Amendment itself, which refers to "the people" rather than to
American citizens and makes no mention of American territory. 7
The invocation of the "people" is ambiguous, however, since people
could be read as a term addressing a group tied to a particular
territory-rooted in a particular place. (Indeed, this is how Chief
Justice Rehnquist interpreted the phrase). The second was that
Verdugo was in fact physically within the United States at the time of
the search. Though in detention in San Diego-having been
arrested-he was nonetheless well within our territorial borders and
was, in a sense, a kind of guest.278 Had Verdugo's residence also been
in San Diego, there is little doubt a warrantless search would have run
afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Why then did the Court hold that
the Constitution offered no protection against the warrantless search
of his home?
The majority was not unaware of the complex geography of the
case. Indeed, it noted Verdugo's forced presence within the United
States, but used this as evidence that he had not developed the sort of
consensual ties that it argued justified protection by the Fourth
Amendment. Earlier cases had suggested that mere geographic
presence might not be sufficient to trigger constitutional protections.
This logic suggested that as ties to the United States deepen,
constitutional protections deepen as well. 79 The Verdugo majority
deployed this concept of deepening ties, plus an historical exegesis
into the original intent behind the word "people," to keep the
defendant, even though he was personally within U.S. territory,
outside the circle of rights-holders. Thus, the right to be free of
276. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
277. U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated ....").
278. Justice Stevens's concurrence in Verdugo argued that the search was governed
by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment because the respondent was "lawfully
present in the United States ... even though he was brought and held here against his
will." Verdugo- Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring).
279. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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unreasonable search and seizure, in the majority's view, has not only a
territorial component but a community-based component as well.
Yet as a doctrinal matter, the connection between deepening ties on
the part of aliens and the level of constitutional protection has little
support. The deepening ties principle predicts that a first-time visitor,
in the United States only briefly, would enjoy the barest minimum of
protection against unreasonable search and seizure. (By definition,
the first-time visitor has no community ties to speak of.) Yet that is
not the result: A Japanese tourist stopping over in Seattle for a
couple of days en route to Canada would in fact enjoy the full
protections of the Fourth Amendment.28 ° The rationale for this
protection is simply spatial. Location within the United States is
deemed fully sufficient to invoke the Amendment's protections. A
pure spatiality principle-rather than a substantial connection
principle-is also reflected in Eisentrager and Quirin. Both suggest
that even enemy aliens captured abroad but brought back to the
United States would enjoy access to U.S. courts on territorial
principles alone. Likewise, aliens captured abroad and brought back
to the United States for trial in federal court are fully protected by the
Constitution's right to a trial by jury, among others. Even the most
generous reading of the deepening ties notion, in short, suggests that it
has been applied inconsistently at best.28'
The current approach also inexplicably, if implicitly, accords some
measure of constitutional rights to aliens in the arena of personal
jurisdiction. As cases like Asahi show, foreign corporations or
individuals cannot, consistent with due process, be haled into
American courts unless they possess the requisite ties to the forum
state.2 82 Given their extraterritorial presence, how foreign citizens and
firms come to possess these constitutional rights is unclear under the
existing regime of legal spatiality. Even the rights of American
citizens are currently subject to a bizarre doctrinal regime in which
constitutional rights against the U.S. government are more secure
when the government acts in Japan then when it acts in Puerto Rico.283
In sum, the current approach to legal spatiality is both anachronistic
280. Unless she was at the border or its functional equivalent, where a general
"border exception" to aspects of the Fourth Amendment is well-established.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The border exception applies
to citizens and aliens alike.
281. As Alex Aleinikoff points out, we treat the question of initial entry to the
United States much more seriously than naturalization. This suggests that citizenship
as membership is not in fact the guiding principle underlying our immigration law and
practice. Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 172-73.
282. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990). "In order to
apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due
process, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United
States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair." Id. at
248-49 (citation omitted).
283. Strangers to the Constitution, supra note 13, at 101.
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and incoherent. The product of a slow and uneven historical
evolution, it lacks any compelling underlying rationale.
C. Rethinking Spatiality
The confusion of the current doctrine casts the virtues of a
despatialized approach in sharper relief. The approach advanced here
dispenses with notions of deepening ties and spatial location and
instead focuses simply on the exercise of government power and the
reasonable accommodations to location that might be justified by
practicality. This approach is not without precedential support. The
Supreme Court in Reid declared that the U.S. government is "a
creature of the Constitution" whose power knows "no other source"
and "can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by
the Constitution."2" The Constitution itself contains no textually
demonstrable spatial limitation. If Reid is to be taken seriously, then
where that government acts ought to be largely irrelevant to an
inquiry of what rights might restrain that power. At a minimum,
location vel non should not be dispositive of legal outcomes.
This position also has the virtue of being rooted in elemental
aspects of American constitutionalism. The United States claims
commitment to the rule of law, limited government, inherent natural
rights, and the proposition that a government derives its just powers
from the consent of the governed. Commitment to these principles
does not entail habeas petitions for every prisoner of war, nor does it
demand the abolition of the legal distinctions that follow from
wartime. But it does counsel that courts ought to treat any person
that comes within the power of the United States as at least
presumptively in possession of the full gamut of protections
reasonably applicable under the circumstances. Spatial location can
help determine what is reasonable, but it should not be used to
formalistically dichotomize the availability of rights. That simple
claim is all that is advanced here. It ought to be uncontroversial, but
as the foregoing has illustrated, it plainly is not.
An example of how a despatialized default assumption would work
in practice can be gleaned from a 2001 case in the Southern District of
New York, United States v. Bin Laden (a case involving pre-
September 11, 2001 incidents). 285  Bin Laden addressed the
interrogation by FBI agents in Kenya of several suspected al-Qaeda
members. These individuals were believed to be perpetrators of the
1998 attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The
question presented to the court was whether the self-incrimination
284. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).
285. United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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provision of the Fifth Amendment 28 6 applied to the overseas
interrogations. The FBI had in fact offered the suspects a reasonably-
modified version of the Miranda287 warning before commencing the
interrogation. Relying on Verdugo and Eisentrager, the government
stated in court, however, that the Miranda warnings that were given
were entirely discretionary due to the foreign location of the
interrogation.288  Spatial location, they claimed, determined the
outcome.
The court took a different approach. It asserted first that the
alleged extraterritoriality of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment was "beside the point. '289  Violations of the privilege
against self-incrimination, it said, occur not at the moment law
enforcement officials coerce statements, but when a defendant's
involuntary statements are actually used against him in a criminal
proceeding. This claim uncritically assumes that there is a spatial
limitation to constitutional rights but further assumes that such a
criminal proceeding would occur on American territory, vitiating any
extraterritorial aspect. This was indeed the factual situation in Bin
Laden.290 But it need not be the case: It is easy to imagine American
civil courts set up abroad, as was commonly the case in the
nineteenth-century consular jurisdiction era-and which may be true
of future U.S. courts, military or civil.
The court then noted the capacious language of the Fifth
Amendment's text, which refers, like several other provisions in the
Constitution, simply to persons rather than to citizens.29 ' Given the
inclination of the Supreme Court to construe this right expansively,
the district court found no compelling reason to imply an atextual
spatial limitation.292  It consequently held that "a defendant's
statements, if extracted by U.S. agents acting abroad, should be
admitted as evidence at trial only if the Government demonstrates
286. U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... ").
287. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
288. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 182 n.10.
289. Id. at 181.
290. See also Mark A. Godsey, Miranda's Final Frontier- The International Arena:
A Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal for a New Miranda
Exception Abroad, 51 Duke L.J. 1703 (2002). Godsey explores and supports the
application of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to
interrogations abroad. But he, like the Bin Laden court, uncritically accepts the
premises of legal spatiality found in cases such as Al Odah, and finds that the privilege
does not involve extraterritorial assertions of rights since any violation of the Fifth
Amendment occurs at trial rather than during interrogation: "Because of the unique
nature of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Miranda doctrine is one of the
few -if not the only- constitutional doctrines that can apply in some circumstances to
non-Americans outside the borders of the United States." Id. at 1780. Godsey
assumes as well that the trial itself will take place within American territory.
291. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
292. Id.
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that the defendant was first advised of his rights and that he validly
waived those rights. ' 293  The U.S. government called this result
"perverse" since, it argued, non-Fourth-Amendment-compliant
statements extracted by foreign police acting abroad remained
admissible in American courts.29' But the court reasonably replied
that it saw "nothing at all anomalous in requiring our own
Government to abide by the strictures of our own Constitution
whenever it seeks to convict an accused, in our own courts, on the
basis of admissions culled via an inherently coercive interrogation
conducted by our own law enforcement. 295
While the Bin Laden opinion fundamentally rested on the premise
that the Self-Incrimination Clause operated at trial (and hence within
American territory in the case at bar), it provides a useful window on
what in practice a despatialized view of American law would entail.
The simplest aspect in the Bin Laden decision involves the "right to
silence" aspect of Miranda warnings. As the court argued, such
warnings are not overly burdensome on law enforcement and serve
the same functional purpose wherever the interrogation by criminal
justice officials may take place. 296 But an additional issue in giving a
Miranda warning is its provision to supply a lawyer. Here, the Bin
Laden court's announced requirements fail a reasonableness test, in
that the district court held that the American agents were required to
make serious efforts in conjunction with local personnel to secure a
lawyer and to investigate local law on the matter. 297 The availability of
a lawyer and the requirements or restraints of local law are clearly not
within the purview of the U.S. agents operating abroad. It seems a
reasonable accommodation of the extraterritorial location of the
interrogation to waive this requirement when U.S. agents act abroad,
especially when they act within the territory of another state. Thus,
under my proposal, the Miranda warning would remain
constitutionally-required, yet would not operate identically outside
the confines of U.S. territory as it would inside our borders. But the
substantial purpose of the Miranda requirement-to inform suspects
of their rights, and to ensure that interrogations are minimally
coercive-can and would be secured outside our borders as well as
within them.
Likewise, when U.S. law enforcement agents work with foreign law
enforcement agents abroad-as they increasingly do-the approach
advanced here counsels that, subject to consideration of the degree of
293. Id. at 187.
294. Id. at 187 n.13.
295. Id.
296. I want to underscore that this particular claim is limited to criminal justice-
related interrogations; clearly the Miranda warning does not apply to interrogations
undertaken by American military officials acting in an armed conflict situation.
297. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
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connection between the foreign and American agents, constitutional
protections ought to apply when the fruits of the investigation are
used in U.S. courts. This view accords with our current doctrine, at
least with regard to searches of citizens' property located abroad. For
example, federal courts generally apply a "joint venture" test in the
context of the Fourth Amendment. The joint venture test compares
the U.S. agent's acts to the "totality of acts done in the search and
seizure. '  In Powell v. Zuckert, for instance, Air Force investigators
joined by Japanese police officials in tandem searched an off-base
dwelling of a civilian Air Force employee.299 The search warrant was
requested by the U.S. Air Force; Japanese officials only participated
pursuant to their agreement to do so under the Status of Forces
Agreement for U.S. military forces stationed in Japan. The D.C.
Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment applied to the search despite
the participation of the Japanese officials; the United States could not,
in essence, wash away the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment
simply by having Japanese police participate in a ride-along. As one
commentator explains:
[I]t is not inconsistent with Powell to suggest that the practicalities
of international law enforcement cooperation are such that a rigid
all-or-nothing approach is not feasible.
... This means, for one thing, that the degree of American
participation is relevant.... In Powell, where no Japanese interest
was being served except compliance with the treaty obligation to
assist American military investigators, the American officials could
more likely have influenced Japanese authorities to conform to
unfamiliar external requirements than in a case where the foreign
authorities were vigorously pursuing the investigation for their own
purposes. 300
Whether one agrees or disagrees with my proposed line-drawing (or
with that of the Southern District of New York or the D.C. Circuit) is
not the critical point. Rather, it is the mode of analysis that is
important. Simple locational analysis ought not be the basis of our
jurisprudence on constitutional rights. In a globalized world, where
violators of regulatory prohibitions or perpetrators of crime or acts of
terror will often be apprehended abroad, American officials
frequently engage in criminal justice and regulatory activities beyond
298. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1968). Even without a
joint venture, evidence may be suppressed if it would "shock the conscience." Rosado
v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 1.8(h) (3d ed. 1996).
299. Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
300. 1 LaFave, supra note 298, § 1.8(h).
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our borders."' Often they will collaborate with foreign regulators and
law enforcement officials in this process. When American officials
interrogate an individual suspected of a crime under American law,
the limitations the Constitution places on the actions of government
officials ought to apply, as a presumptive matter, wherever that
interrogation occurs. To do otherwise uncritically resurrects
antiquated territorial distinctions, while simultaneously creating
perverse incentives for U.S. law enforcement to pursue investigations,
interrogations, and detentions offshore. When borders are so easily
crossed and the panoply of governmental power so easily projected
abroad, such incentives are not trivial-as the creation of a detention
center at Guantanamo so aptly illustrates.
Twenty-first-century courts need to think functionally, not
formalistically, about the spatial scope of the restraints on government
power, just as they have long thought functionally and not
formalistically when addressing the spatial scope of the exercise of
sovereign power itself. That simple proposition will go a long way
toward decoupling geography from justice.
CONCLUSION
What is the connection between law and land? The supposition
that the scope of the law is determined by territorial location-what I
have termed legal spatiality -suffuses our intuitions about the law.
Yet the last century has witnessed a transformation of legal spatiality
across a range of legal doctrines. With rare exception, it is only with
regard to noncitizens, and even then not in all circumstances, that the
federal courts continue to cling to the notion that American law is
tethered to territory-that individual rights ebb and flow based on
where that individual is physically located.
In this Article, I have described the origins of legal spatiality and
illustrated its uneven evolution. While it is difficult to discern a
coherent trend in the various lines of cases related to spatiality, the
general thrust has been toward contextual, functional considerations
of jurisdiction. The U.S. government's current stance with regard to
Guantanamo reflects a countervailing thread in the doctrinal skein, in
which a dangerous world necessitates sharp distinctions between
301. Nadelmann, supra note 74; Mark Gibney, Policing the World: The Long
Reach of U.S. Law and the Short Arm of the Constitution, 6 Conn. J. Int'l L. 103
(1990). The United States has many mutual legal assistance treaties, or MLATs, in
place in an effort to bolster cooperation with foreign governments when pursuing
criminals extraterritorially. See, e.g., Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty,
Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-Mex., S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-13 (1988), 27 I.L.M. 443; see also
Bruce Zagaris, Developments in International Judicial Assistance and Related Matters,
18 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 339 (1990).
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citizen and alien.3 2 But this countervailing thread is, I have argued,
largely founded upon nineteenth-century assumptions of legal
spatiality. Particularly in the case of Guantanamo, it is also at odds
with the plain fact that the United States controls Guantanamo
thoroughly and, should it desire, in perpetuity. As Justice Anthony
Kennedy argued in Rasul, this fact is clear and ought to inform our
understanding of the relevant applicable law.303
Rethinking our approach to territoriality-the basis of the
Westphalian state, the model of the last 400 years-is no easy task.
This Article does not provide a comprehensive new model of legal
spatiality. It does, however, clarify the questions and assumptions at
stake and proposes that we at least abandon the formalistic, static, and
anachronistic approach to spatiality that appears far too frequently in
both the Federal Reports and government briefs. In an increasingly
interconnected world, simple spatial distinctions cannot provide us
with helpful, or just, guidance in understanding the scope of our legal
order.
302. This was presaged in Verdugo. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 275 (1990).
303. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2700 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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